By analyzing a hand-collected transaction-level dataset on the finance leases of China’s public firms for the period 2007–19, this article sheds light on China’s leasing market, the second largest in the world. We find that banks use their affiliated leasing firms to provide credit to clients in order to circumvent the government’s targeted credit tightening policy. In contrast to conventional view of regulatory arbitrage, our evidence shows that, rather than hiding risk and gambling for profit, banks-affiliated leasing firms have prudent risk control and efficient pricing. These bank-affiliated institutions are used by banks to play strategic role in relationship banking. Moreover, the ownership of the lessor also matters for the financing choice of the lessee.

Financing constraints are important to triggering controlling shareholders' share pledges. However, the related literature faces two major challenges: the endogeneity problem and the lack of direct evidence of why and how individual share pledges can ease corporate financing constraints. Based on China's Share Pledge Reform (SPR) in Q4 2012 and the phenomenon that private firms face discrimination when obtaining bank loans, this paper studies the impact of financing constraints on share pledging behavior and its mechanisms by building a difference-in-differences (DID) model. The SPR makes it more convenient for shareholders to raise money through share pledges, and shareholders of private firms facing stronger financing constraints are more vulnerable to this reform than are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the SPR, the probability of share pledging by controlling shareholders of private firms is approximately 23.04% higher than that of controlling shareholders of SOEs, and the pledge ratio is approximately 16.53% higher. Further tests reveal that, after the SPR, controlling shareholders of private firms are more inclined than those of SOEs to provide loans to the company to alleviate its financing constraints. Heterogeneity tests further corroborate the finding that this effect is more significant in private firms that are smaller and do not have shareholders of banking and institutional firms among their top ten shareholders.

This study investigates the underexplored role of onsite viewing activities in the housing search process. By incorporating buyer heterogeneity into the housing search model of Courant (1978), we show that buyers with higher private valuations tend to view more properties onsite and ultimately pay higher prices. Utilising a proprietary dataset from the largest real estate agency in Beijing, our analysis reveals that increased onsite viewings significantly enhance both the likelihood of a transaction and the final purchase price. We establish causality by employing an instrumental variable approach that leverages exogenous variations in heavy pollution and rainfall, which hinder buyers’ ability to conduct onsite house viewings. More intensive onsite viewings raise transaction price as they reveal a buyer’s higher private valuation to the seller. Besides, onsite viewings also function through reducing information asymmetry and improving match quality.

We ask how export demand shocks associated with the Asian financial crisis affected Chinese exporters. We construct firm-specific exchange rate shocks based on the precrisis destinations of firms' exports. Because the shocks were unanticipated and large, they are a plausible instrument for identifying the impact of exporting on firm productivity and other outcomes. We find that firms whose export destinations experience greater currency depreciation have slower export growth and that export growth leads to increases in firm productivity and other firm performance measures. Consistent with “learning-by-exporting,” the productivity impact of export growth is greater when firms export to more developed countries.