Abstract This article presents a model that incorporates habit formation and long-run risks into the Epstein–Zin preferences, and reveals intertemporal substitution as a distinctive channel, separate from risk aversion, in generating key asset market phenomena. With habit formation, both the risk aversion and intertemporal substitution channels enhance the market price of short-run consumption risk. With long-run risks, intertemporal substitution reduces the market prices of long-run consumption risks, working against risk aversion. The contrasting effects of the intertemporal substitution channel drive key differences in the model implications of habit formation and long-run risks.

We document the growth in higher education costs and tuition over the past 50 years. To explain these trends, we develop a general equilibrium model with skill- and sector-biased technical change. Finding the model’s parameters through a combination of estimation and calibration, we show that it can explain the rise in college costs between 1961 and 2009, along with the increase in college attainment and the change in the relative earnings of college graduates. The model predicts that if college costs had ceased to grow after 1961, enrollment in 2010 would have been 3%–6% higher.

We analyze the contribution of leisure preferences to a model of long-run risks in leisure and consumption growth. The marginal utility of consumption is affected by short- and long-run risks in leisure under nonseparable and recursive preferences. We match equity risk premia and macroeconomic moments with plausible coefficients of relative-risk aversion. Additionally, the model generates a less negative to positively sloped average real yield curve, depending on the elasticity of substitution between the consumption of nondurables and services and leisure. Further, the incorporation of leisure in utility allows us to derive model implications for the return on human capital. Received October 11, 2011; accepted December 24, 2015 by Editor Wayne Ferson.

Abstract This paper examines how overconfidence affects the properties of management forecasts. Using both the “over‐optimism” and “miscalibration” dimensions of overconfidence to generate our predictions, we examine three research questions. First, we examine whether overconfidence increases the likelihood of issuing a forecast. Second, we examine whether overconfidence increases the amount of optimism in management forecasts. Third, we examine whether overconfidence increases the precision of the forecast. Using both options‐ and press‐based measures to proxy for individual overconfidence, we find support for all three research questions.

Using a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2014, we document strong evidence of investment inefficiency, which we explain through a combination of financing constraints and agency problems. Specifically, we argue that firms with cash flow below (above) their optimal level tend to under- (over-)invest as a consequence of financial constraints (agency costs). Furthermore, focusing on under-investing firms, we highlight that the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow rise with traditionally used measures of financing constraints, while for over-investing firms, the sensitivities increase with a wide range of firm-specific measures of agency costs.

We explore the motives and consequences of bond tender offers announced in connection with mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We find merging firms use bond tender offers strategically to renegotiate with bondholders to gain financial flexibility by reducing leverage and eliminating covenants, and to curtail the coinsurance benefits associated with M&A. Moreover, we find bondholder wealth effects depend not only on the bond's own characteristics, but also on the characteristics of its sibling bonds. Finally, the use of bond tender offers in M&A is associated with increased likelihood of deal consummation and lower acquisition premiums.

We examine signing bonuses awarded to executives hired for or promoted to named executive officer (NEO) positions at Standard & Poor's 1500 companies during the period 1992–2011. Executive signing bonuses are sizable and increasing in use, and they are labeled by the media as “golden hellos.” We find that executive signing bonuses are mainly awarded at firms with greater information asymmetry and higher innate risks, especially to younger executives, to mitigate the executives’ concerns about termination risk. When termination concerns are strong, signing bonus awards are associated with better performance and retention outcomes.

Does state ownership breed risk-taking behavior in commercial banks? This paper examines this issue using a panel of Chinese banks. We find that state-ownership is in general associated with higher risks. In addition, we find that banks controlled by the central government have the highest credit risk, while those owned by local governments have the lowest capital adequacy ratio and liquidity ratio. By compiling a complete list of cross-border acquisitions in China’s banking sector, we investigate the impact of foreign acquisition on state-owned banks’ risk-taking using differences-in-differences and matching estimators. We find that foreign acquisition has a reducing effect on state-owned banks’ risk-taking and this effect is particularly significant for banks that are controlled by central or local government. We also find that this risk-reducing effect depends on the percentage of foreign ownership, the local business involvement of the foreign investors, and the number of foreign members on the banks’ boards of directors.

Abstract Recent studies suggest the transfer of privileged information via social ties but do not explicitly examine the cost of these ties to shareholders. We document a significant positive relation between stock transaction costs and a company’s social ties to the investment community. Social ties based on education and leisure activities, stronger ties, and ties to individuals responsible for trading have greater effects. Using investment connection deaths as natural experiments, we document that exogenous severance of ties reduces trading costs and trading activities by connected parties. Our evidence illustrates an important and previously undocumented consequence of social ties.

ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on voluntary disclosure. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we document a significant increase in the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts following mandatory IFRS adoption, consistent with the notion that IFRS adoption alters firms' disclosure incentives in response to increased capital-market demand. We find the increase to be larger among firms domiciled in code-law countries, suggesting a catching-up effect among firms facing low disclosure incentives pre-adoption. We then propose and test three channels through which IFRS adoption could alter firms' disclosure incentives: improved earnings quality, increased shareholder demand, and increased analyst demand. We find evidence consistent with all three channels.