Based on a survey of 1, 268 firms in 12 cities, this article empirically studies unions' effects on worker welfare in China. Regressions carried out on a rich set of specifications show that unionization is significantly associated with higher hourly wages and larger pension coverage and weakly associated with lower monthly working hours. Further econometric analysis finds that unions promote individual and collective contracts. The effect of collective contracts vanishes when unions are present, whereas individual contracts have independent and positive effects. In addition, unions have effects on workers' welfare independent of collective and individual contracts.

We propose a theory of security design in financing entrepreneurial production, positing that the investor can acquire costly information on the entrepreneur’s project before making the financing decision. When the entrepreneur has enough bargaining power in security design, the optimal security helps incentivize both efficient information acquisition and efficient financing. Debt is optimal when information is not very valuable for production, whereas the combination of debt and equity is optimal when information is valuable. If, instead, the investor has sufficiently strong bargaining power in security design or can acquire information only after financing, equity is optimal

We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens’ informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We construct a novel dataset to document political reforms, policy outcomes, and de facto power for almost four decades. We find that the introduction of elections improves popular policies and weakens unpopular ones. Increases in regional government resources lead to loss of village autonomy, but less so in remote villages. These patterns are consistent with an organizational view of local elections within autocracies.

We develop a continuous-time asset allocation model to investigate the effects of mean-reverting stock returns on investors with Prospect Theory (PT) preferences. Our semi-analytical solution facilitates a comprehensive exploration of how the stock investment of PT investors may differ when accounting for mean reversion. We find that incorporating mean reversion attenuates the distinct V-shaped demand pattern in relation to contemporaneous prices, which is more pronounced when mean reversion is absent, by significantly reducing PT investors’ stock demand following price increases. This shift leads to a stock demand profile that demonstrates an inverse relationship with stock prices. In line with this change, we also show that combining PT utility with mean reversion predicts short-term contrarian behavior and the disposition effect more reliably than benchmark models that incorporate either PT utility or mean-reverting returns alone.