We examine how the financial constraints of repurchasing firms affect their post-buyback performance. By every constraint measure we use, a set of constrained firms repurchase. They display significantly poorer post-buyback abnormal return and operating performance than unconstrained firms. Financial constraints are more important in explaining the performance of share buybacks for firms with high actual repurchase ratios. Constrained firms, especially those with high actual repurchase ratios, experience a significantly greater increase in post-buyback distress risk than unconstrained firms. Managerial hubris could explain why constrained firms buy back shares even if the buybacks do not improve shareholder wealth.

To explain why firms with high research and development (R&D) intensity offer their investors higher stock returns, we argue that (1) high R&D capacity relative to firm valuation makes R&D-intensive firms attractive takeover targets, and that (2) the higher takeover probability leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, as proposed by Cremers, Nair, and John (2009), and require higher returns. We find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Furthermore, we find that takeover probability also relates to large R&D increases, but not to innovation efficiency. Accordingly, we expect and find that takeover risk helps to explain the premium associated with large R&D increases, but not the innovation efficiency premium previously documented.

We examine how research and development (R&D) incoming spillovers affect long-run firm performance following firms’ R&D increases. We use a stochastic frontier production method to capture R&D incoming spillover effects. Firms reaping more benefits from R&D investment made by other firms experience more improvement in profitability and more favorable long-run stock performance in the post-R&D-increase period. Firms with higher levels of R&D incoming spillovers recruit more key employees from other firms, suggesting that obtaining know-how through hiring is an important source of incoming spillovers. The evidence also shows that firms experiencing more R&D outgoing spillover effects tend to underinvest in R&D.

A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as “cheap talk.” Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.

We examine how direct tax incentives affect firm innovation performance using a new U.S. R&D tax credit regime enacted in 2007, the Alternative Simplified Credit (ASC). A difference-in- differences analysis indicates that innovation performance is poorer for ASC users than for firms using the original R&D tax credit method following the ASC enactment. The results are stronger for firms with poorer governance and greater innovation diversity. ASC users suffer from poorer profitability and lower valuations. The findings remain robust to self-selection bias and various robustness checks. Our evidence favors a dark-side view of R&D tax credit effects under the ASC.

We examine the motives behind the share repurchase decisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms by studying the stock and operating performance after the IPO date. We find that IPO firms that announce repurchases within 3years of IPO dates exhibit poorer long-run abnormal operating performance than other IPO firms. These IPO firms also experience poorer stock return performance and downward analyst forecast revisions. Moreover, these firms show intensive insider selling transactions after the IPO date. These results for IPO announcing repurchase firms are consistent with the misleading hypothesis, which suggests that these IPO firms mislead investors by announcing repurchases as false signals.