This study examines whether and how earnings quality, measured as accruals quality (AQ), affects the cost of equity capital. Using two-stage cross-sectional regression tests, we find that the AQ risk factor is significantly priced, after controlling for low-priced stocks. This result is robust in tests using individual stocks, various portfolio formations, and different beta estimations. Furthermore, we show that AQ and its pricing effect systematically vary with business cycles and macroeconomic variables. In particular, this pricing effect is prominent in total AQ and innate AQ but not in discretionary AQ. The risk premium associated with AQ exists only in economic expansion but not in recession periods. Poorer AQ firms are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. The risk premium and the dispersion of AQ are also related to future economic activity. Overall, our results suggest that AQ contributes to the cost of equity capital and that its pricing effect is associated with fundamental risk.

This paper finds that banks led by socially connected CEOs have a higher degree of systemic risk compared to banks with less socially connected CEOs. To address endogeneity concerns, we employ a difference-in-differences design and the instrumental variable method using CEO death as an exogenous shock to the social network. Our study uncovers two key mechanisms through which CEO social networks impact bank systemic risk. First, banks governed by connected CEOs are more active in interbank transactions. Second, bank pairs featuring connected CEOs display a greater asset similarity in comparison to those without connected CEOs. These findings highlight the significant impact of CEO social connections on banks' interconnectedness and their potential contribution to systemic risk in the banking sector.

Are all covenants equally effective at reducing the bondholder-shareholder conflict? Examining the most frequently used bond covenants, we document that four out of 24 restrictions are associated with significantly higher bankruptcy risk. The use of these Default Indicating covenants can be partly explained by faulty contract design, greater recovery in bankruptcy, or within-creditor conflicts. Firms that use In-House Counsel to help structure their bond issue and those that use Big 4 Auditors are also less likely to include Default Indicating covenants in their bonds. Further tests show that the use of these Default Indicating covenants is associated with higher bond and CDS spreads. Overall, the results help explain the prior evidence on the relation between covenant use and the cost of debt.

We examine the impact of country-level political rights on the cost of debt for corporate bonds issued by firms incorporated in 39 countries. Similar to, but separate from, the relation for creditor rights, greater political rights are associated with lower yield spreads. A one standard deviation increase in political rights is associated with an 18.6% decline in bond spreads. We find evidence that political and legal institutions are substitutes; marginal improvements in political rights produce greater reductions in the cost of debt for firms from countries with weaker creditor rights. We examine potential factors through which political rights may affect the cost of debt and find that greater freedom of the press provides an important channel for reducing bond risks. Moreover, debt of firms with cross-listed equity trades at a premium in U.S. markets, but this relation appears to be more consistent with improved visibility than with bonding effects.

This study highlights the positive impact of a stock market listing on workplace safety. We find that workplace injuries in publicly listed firms are lower than those in comparable private firms, and this effect relates to heightened monitoring by the media and regulators. The media pays more attention to public firms’ safety issues than to those of private firms, and the reduced media scrutiny due to local newspaper closures leads to greater increases in injuries in public firms. Regulators also monitor public firms more strictly, evidenced by a higher likelihood of nonroutine inspections and larger penalties for detected violations.