We propose a new framework to explain the factor structure in the full cross section of Treasury bond returns. Our method unifies non-parametric curve estimation with cross-sectional factor modeling. We identify smoothness as a fundamental principle of the term structure of returns. Our approach implies investable factors, which correspond to the optimal spanning basis functions in decreasing order of smoothness. Our factors explain the slope and curvature shapes frequently encountered in PCA. In a comprehensive empirical study, we show that the first four factors explain the time-series variation and risk premia of the term structure of excess returns. Cash flows are covariances as the exposure of bonds to factors is fully explained by cash flow information. We identify a state-dependent complexity premium. The fourth factor, which captures complex shapes of the term structure premium, substantially reduces pricing errors and pays off during recessions.

This paper examines whether one of the most important participants in the takeover market, the institutional investors of target companies, suffers from the disposition effect and, if so, how this selling bias influences the takeover outcomes. I report robust evidence that target institutional investors are reluctant to realize losses. This bias further allows their sunk cost to affect both the takeover price and the deal success. My results are explained by neither the undervalued targets nor the 52-week-high price effect. They are most pronounced among targets whose investors have a strong propensity to hold on to loser stocks.

This study uses Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) method to separate active institutional investors from passive ones and shows that active investors can alleviate the anomalous comovement of stock returns. Focusing on 2 events linked to the excess comovement anomaly, Standard & Poor’s 500 Index additions and stock splits, I find that if an event stock has more active institutional investors trading in the post-event period, the anomalous comovement effect disappears. In contrast, if an event stock experiences a massive exit of active investors, this anomaly persists. The exit of active institutional investors also results in a strong price synchronicity effect.

We empirically explore a trade credit channel through which foreign direct investment (FDI) firms can propagate global liquidity shocks to the host country despite its tight controls on portfolio flows. In a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, we find robust evidence that FDI firms provide more trade credit than local firms during tight domestic credit periods and that a favorable global liquidity shock amplifies FDI firms’ advantage in trade credit provision. Moreover, the differential responses of FDI and local firms are stronger in financially more dependent industries or in Chinese provinces with less financial depth.

We show a negative effect of opioid prescriptions on subsequent individual employment among employers in our sample using doctor-opioid-prescribing propensity as our instrument. This finding has implications for firms that must now contend with lower local labor supply. We find a negative relationship between opioid prescriptions and subsequent establishment growth. However, firms respond to labor shortages by investing more in technology, replacing the relatively scarcer labor with capital, especially when they are not financially constrained. We find positive abnormal returns, upon the passage of state laws intended to limit opioid prescriptions, that are driven by firms more reliant on labor.

We investigate the impact of anti-corruption regulations on corporate investment by leveraging the implementation of global financial disclosure laws. Our findings reveal that, subsequent to the adoption of these laws, there is a reduction in the rate of corporate investment, alongside an enhancement in investment efficiency. This suggests that anti-corruption policies serve to curb firms’ excessive investment, which is often fueled by government subsidies in corrupt environments. Our analysis provides valuable insights into the advantages of anti-corruption laws and carries significant policy implications.

We provide new evidence on the substitute role of mobile banking in small business lending after banks close branches. Compared to the matched bank-counties with similar economic conditions and bank financials, small business lending in the treatment counties decreases 0.064 million (equivalent to 18.8%) less after branch closings for banks with mobile apps than banks without mobile apps. The effect is more pronounced in high-income census tracts and for high-rated apps, suggesting that high-income customers and customers whose banks provide better mobile apps are less affected when banks close branches. We do not find a significant impact of having apps on small business lending when banks increase the number of branches. However, the effect of having mobile apps increases with closed branches' years of service. Our results imply that bank branches are still important in providing credit to the local communities. Mobile banking helps preserve the existing customer-bank relationship but cannot reduce information asymmetry.