Trust is often posited to substitute for management control in interfirm transactions. However, this raises questions of how trust arises in new relationships, and whether trust that is not based on prior experience transacting together is sufficient to persuade managers to forgo investments in management controls. We use an experiment to test whether two features of the early stage of an interfirm relationship influence a buyer's initial trust in a supplier and have consequences for subsequent investments in management controls and in the collaboration. These two features are the autonomy of the buyer's manager to choose a supplier (i.e., delegation of decision‐making authority) and the supplier's willingness to share information with the buyer. We find that the buyer manager's initial trust in the supplier is associated positively with both the autonomy to choose the supplier and the supplier's willingness to share information. Information content and supplier characteristics are held constant, so these results are novel and distinct from prior studies of the antecedents of trust. We find that higher initial trust is associated with reduced expenditures for management controls and increased investments in the collaboration. Thus, we conclude that delegation of decision‐making authority and supplier information‐sharing behavior in the early stages of a relationship influence the formation of initial trust, which has real consequences for investments in management control and in the collaboration.

We investigate whether prior collaboration experience affects a focal partner's response to the precision of monitoring controls adopted by a new partner, with consequences for their goodwill trust in, and subsequent cooperation with, the new partner. We expect the partner to interpret their new partner's adoption of precise monitoring controls as either an effort to limit their autonomy or to reduce information asymmetry. The partner's experience with past partners is posited to determine which interpretation is salient, with negative (positive) experiences favoring the former (latter). We find that partners with an uncooperative (cooperative) experience exhibit lower (higher) goodwill trust in the new partner when controls are more precise. Further, prior experience moderates the indirect relation between the precision of monitoring controls and partner cooperation acting through goodwill trust. The results demonstrate the importance of prior experiences in the design of interfirm controls for current partner relationships. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

This study explores how initial control choice influences the ease with which outsourcing firms switch suppliers. We recognize that firms invest in controls to manage collaborative relationships, and argue that these investments generate switching costs, namely, opportunity and reinvestment costs. We collect data on outsourcing transactions by conducting semi-structured interviews across multiple field sites. Observed patterns across 53 cases show that firms with trust-based controls experience the most difficulty in switching suppliers, whereas firms with market-based controls experience the greatest ease. Firms with bureaucratic-based and hybrid controls generally lie between these extremes. Furthermore, in nearly 50 percent of our sample (25 cases), respondents indicate that the switching costs associated with control choices increase the difficulty of switching suppliers. We also find evidence that the magnitude and nature of switching costs vary with the types of controls chosen. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to confidentiality agreements with participating firms.