This paper proposes that both the first‐come, first‐served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs. The first‐come, first‐served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors. This payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks. Therefore, failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks. Contagious runs may occur even if (i) depositors choose the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and (ii) the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare. The feasibility of reforming the FDIC to impose market discipline is also investigated.

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An improvement in the transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that bank managers may use their influence to eliminate both inefficient and efficient bank runs.

Using U.S. banking data between 1993 and 2014, this paper investigates the relationship between CEO optimism and bank liquidity creation. It finds that banks with optimistic CEOs create more liquidity over the entire sample period. In addition, the positive effect of CEO optimism on liquidity creation became stronger during the subprime crisis of 2007‒2009, and this stronger effect was mainly driven by banks with high capital ratios and large banks. These results imply that CEO optimism is likely to encourage banks to create liquidity, especially during banking crises. The results presented in this paper hold when subjected to various robustness checks.

Using U.S. bank data from 1996 to 2013, this paper studies how liquidity risk affects bank performance in financial crises. It finds that during the subprime crisis of 2007–09, liquidity risk reduced a bank’s survival probability, ROA, and net interest margin, and increased its loan-loss-provision expenses. This adverse effect was more severe for banks with lower capital ratios and higher credit risk. In contrast, there is no strong evidence that liquidity risk hurts bank performance in market crises. The results in this paper imply that liquidity risk is not merely a symptom of banks’ insolvency problems; it has an independent effect on bank performance in banking crises.

In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.