In this study, we examine how achievement‐related tendencies are expressed in the professional auditing context, particularly through the interplay between the CEO and the audit partner. We use the facial width‐to‐height ratio (fWHR), a stable morphological trait widely applied in prior research, as a proxy for achievement drive. Using a sample of US audit partners from 2016 to 2019, we find that higher achievement drive is associated with enhanced audit quality, evidenced by fewer restatements and lower abnormal accruals. Auditors with higher achievement drive are also more likely to become industry experts, attain leadership positions, and achieve partnership status more quickly. Importantly, we find that high‐achievement‐drive audit partners are more inclined to assert dominance in negotiations, particularly when working with equally driven CEOs, leading to improved audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that, when activated in auditing contexts, achievement‐oriented tendencies, as proxied by fWHR, are linked to higher audit quality.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) misconduct often negatively impacts firms and damages their reputation. Using data on U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2018, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to establish board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance after a CSR-related violation than with other firms. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in violating firms that have a greater incentive to maintain their reputation than in other firms. We also find that the capital market and the media react positively to board interlock announcements by violating firms. However, we find no improvement in future CSR performance or a reduced likelihood of future CSR misconduct after the formation of such board interlocks. Altogether, our findings suggest that establishing board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance is an effective signaling strategy for reputation management for firms engaging in CSR misconduct.

In recent years, firms have increasingly come under scrutiny from environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies which systematically assess and publicize ESG-related information to diverse stakeholders. This study aims to investigate whether firms exhibit a heightened incentive to avoid ESG-related regulatory violations once they come under the coverage of ESG rating agencies. Analyzing data spanning from 2000 to 2018 and considering the coverage provided by four prominent ESG rating agencies to U.S. firms, we leverage the staggered initiation and intensity of this coverage. Our findings reveal a negative correlation between ESG violations and the commencement and extent of coverage by ESG rating agencies. This relationship is particularly pronounced for firms characterized by lower levels of corporate monitoring as indicated by fewer analysts providing coverage, limited media attention, weaker ESG commitments, and less disparate ESG ratings. Taken together, our study sheds light on the monitoring role of ESG rating agencies, illustrating their significance in incentivizing managers to mitigate ESG violations.