Since the 2008 financial crisis, the mortgage market has been renovating its tools and instruments in order to avoid a new crisis. One such innovative instrument is the participating mortgage, in which the lender gains part of the net operating income and/or future appreciation. In this paper, we establish a financing model for participating mortgages, incorporating early termination options such as default and two prepayment clauses, defeasance and prepayment penalty. Later, we illustrate a detailed sensitivity analysis of the model. The values of early termination options depend on the choice of parameters in the model, as well as the term structure of short term rates. Finally, we show that a participation rate of 11.24% results in zero mortgage interest rate using the parameters in our simulation.

This paper investigates the characteristics of the operational loss data formation mechanism that takes place between the date of discovery of a new operational risk event and the final settlement date on which all losses are materialized. The first loss that characterizes the initial impact of a new operational risk event frequently triggers a sequence of related losses. Then, losses generated by the same event are not independent and follow a predictable scheme and the frequency of secondary losses is not homogeneous: both are functions of the initial loss amount and time. We model the arrival intensity and loss severities with a shot-noise stochastic process and derive its key properties. We then discuss implications of our model for the estimation of the regulatory capital charge for operational risk. In an empirical analysis, we find strong evidence of a shot-noise behavior in operational losses using the data of a major US commercial bank.

The capital structure irrelevance argument of Modigliani and Miller (1958) implies that the use of debt or leases should have no impact on firm values. This classical argument leaves out several important considerations crucial for the result, in particular, counterparty credit risk. We re-examine the capital structure problem for firms that can utilize debt and leases in the presence of counterparty risk. Our numerical and empirical estimates show a negative term structure of lease rates that steepens as a function of counterparty risk. Moreover, we document numerical evidence for the complementary relationship between debt and leases in the presence of counterparty risk.

This paper focuses on the defaultable lease rate term structure with endogenous default. We combine the competitive lease market argument proposed by Grenadier (1996) and the endogenous default structural model proposed by Leland and Toft (1996) to examine the interaction between the lessee’s capital structure and the equilibrium lease rate. Under this framework, determining the lease rate is a simultaneous equation problem that captures the trade-off between debt and lease financing. Using data on 2,482 real estate lease transactions, we empirically confirm the predictions derived from the numerical analysis of the model.

This study assesses a new mechanism, the deposit channel, in the transmission of interest rate shock to household consumption using an administrative panel data set of financial transactions for Turkey. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in consumers' adherence to the Islamic laws that forbid earning interest and employs a standard difference-in-difference design. Following an unanticipated announcement of interest rate hike, rate-sensitive consumers significantly reduce their overall spending, and the response persists throughout the post-announcement period. The response of debt payment, disparate exposure to inflation, exchange rate, and the demographic difference can hardly fully account for the documented consumption response heterogeneity.

Using account-level credit card data from a large Turkish bank, we study the impact of a unique credit card policy that increases minimum payment on consumption and debt repayment. We show that the policy reduces credit card spending and debt, boosts existing debt repayment, and reduces credit card delinquency. The credit card debt of affected consumers falls on average by 50% two years into the policy’s implementation. An increase in minimum payment has a stronger effect than does a decrease of a similar magnitude. We build a benchmark life cycle model with soft liquidity constraint to explain the reduction in credit card spending.