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Are non-family successors all the same? Inside-promoted vs. outside-sourced

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 71, 102122
This paper studies the differences in post-succession changes in managerial styles and operating performance among three types of successors, namely family successors, inside-promoted non-family successors and outside non-family successors. The data is drawn from Taiwan, where family firms dominate the domestic stock market and there exists a rich, lengthy data set available for analysis. We find that firms having undergone outside non-family successions increase operating performance. This result, however, comes with the cost of managerial short-termism, leading to a reduction in long-term investment. On the other hand, outside non-family successors also improve investor relationships while impairing employee and bank relationships. In contrast, inside-promoted non-family successors tend to increase long-term investment, which differentiates them from family successors who do not adjust investment policies after successions; elsewhere these two types of successors' managerial styles appear to be relatively similar.

Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition

Journal of Banking & Finance 2005 29(7), 1857-1885
This paper examines the determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a function of board composition in Taiwan – a country that features relatively weak protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor governance when the board is dominated by members who are affiliated with the controlling family but good governance when the board is dominated by members who are not affiliated with the controlling family. In particular board affiliation is higher when negative entrenchment effects – measured by (1) divergence in control and cash flow rights, (2) family control, and (3) same CEO and Chairman – are strong and lower when positive incentive effects, measured by cash flow rights, are strong. Moreover, relative firm value is negatively related to board affiliation in family-controlled firms. Thus, the proportion of directors represented by a controlling family appears to be a reasonable proxy for the quality of corporate governance at the firm level when investor protection is relatively weak and it is difficult to determine the degree of separation between ownership and control.

Are all regulatory compliant independent director appointments the same? An analysis of Taiwanese board appointments

Journal of Corporate Finance 2018 50, 371-387 open access
Globally many regulators adopted a rules-based approach to independent director appointments stipulating ‘independence’ criteria. This paper investigates whether partitioning a regulatory compliant sample of independent director appointments by prior affiliation to the board influences the relationship between ownership and control rights, and performance. We report a significant positive relationship between board independence and controlling shareholders' cash-flow rights for firms where the appointee had prior affiliation to the board, but no performance improvement. Firms where the regulatory compliant independent directors had no prior-affiliation to the board experienced significant improvement in firms' next period Return-on-Assets. Appointing affiliated directors is indicative diminished board quality, which is consistent with the empirical evidence that controlling shareholders determine board quality to accommodate tunneling to extract the private benefits of control to compensate for significant additional costs associated with concentrated ownership (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015). The positive association between performance and unaffiliated independent directors suggests a desire to introduce expertise to receive benefits via improved firm performance which is consistent with the literature, mostly from studies of emerging markets, reporting a causal link from independent directors to firm performance (Choi et al., 2007; Dahya et al. 2008; Liu et al., 2015).

The family business map: Framework, selective survey, and evidence from Chinese family firm succession

Journal of Corporate Finance 2015 33, 212-226 open access
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of founding family engagement in firm ownership and management. We hypothesize that families manage their firms because they are able to make contributions that non-family managers cannot provide. However, roadblocks arising from within the family, from markets, and from surrounding institutions challenge family ownership. We propose a new framework for organizing these assets and roadblocks, called the family business map; this framework is useful for categorizing the papers presented in this Special Issue. We support the predictions of the framework with evidence from Chinese family firm succession, and conclude that family firm organization is an adaptation to environmental opportunities and constraints. We end the paper with suggestions for future research.