We document significant reductions in corporate payouts-both dividends and (to a larger extent) share repurchases-during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Payout reductions are more likely in firms with higher leverage, more valuable growth options, and lower cash balances, i.e., those more susceptible to the negative consequences of an external financing shock. Moreover, firms appear to use the proceeds from the reduction in payout to maintain cash levels and to fund investment. These findings are consistent with the view that a shock to the supply of credit (net of demand effects) during the financial crisis increased the marginal benefit of cash retention, leading some firms to turn to payout reductions as a substitute form of financing.

How does trust affect business contracting at the firm level? We analyze the case of foreign high-tech companies investing in China, where the risk of expropriation of their intellectual property is high. We find that firms mitigate this type of risk by taking local trustworthiness into account when making investment decisions. Firms prefer to invest in regions where local partners and employees are considered more trustworthy; they are also more likely to establish joint ventures and to make greater research and development investments. We employ instrumental variable regressions and dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimators to alleviate endogeneity concerns and control for time-invariant heterogeneity.

Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.