We examine the effects of bank–firm relationships on firm performance in Japan. When access to capital markets is limited, close bank–firm ties increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms, but do not lead to higher profitability or growth. The cost of capital of firms with close bank ties is higher than that of their peers. This indicates that most of the benefits from these relationships are appropriated by the banks. Finally, the slow growth rates of bank clients suggest that banks discourage firms from investing in risky, profitable projects. However, liberalization of financial markets reduces the banks' market power.

We examine the link between minority shareholders’ rights and corporate governance by studying institutional investors’ voting patterns in a concentrated ownership environment. Institutions rarely vote against insider-sponsored proposals even when the law empowers the minority. Institutions vote against compensation-related proposals more often than against related party transactions even when minority shareholders cannot influence outcomes. Potentially conflicted institutions are more likely to vote for insiders’ proposals than stand-alone investors, regardless of their effect on outcomes. A plausible conclusion is that empowering minority shareholders affects the selection of proposals but not actual voting; another is that empowering minority shareholders is ineffective without addressing conflicts of interest.

Using standard Industrial Organization tools, we analyze the relation between competition in arm's length financial markets and the prevalence of close bank-firms ties. We show how the degree of competition between financial intermediaries affects the intensity of relationships between banks and client firms, and explore the idea that investment in bank-firm relationships can be used strategically by incumbent multi-product (universal) banks to limit competition in arm's length markets. The analysis implies that reforms designed to facilitate entry of new intermediaries may actually induce incumbent banks to increase investment in relationship banking, so that regulatory entry barriers are replaced by entry barriers created endogenously, namely, there is “path dependence” in the market structure of financial systems. This result suggests that increased (potential) competition in the financial services industry will not always destroy bank-firm relationships but, on the contrary, may actually strengthen them.

How do firms that go public decide whether to list on a major stock exchange or locally? Using a unique data set on Israeli IPOs in the US and Tel Aviv, we show that companies that list in the US are young and overwhelmingly high-tech oriented. We argue that high-quality innovative firms are willing to incur additional costs associated with listing in the US in order to reveal their value and distinguish themselves from firms that issue stock back home. Costs of listing in the US include first day underpricing and relinquishing corporate control.

We document increased stock price comovement for companies added to major indices around the world. Using data on forty developed and emerging markets for 10 years, we find that in most markets, when added to a major index, firms experience an increase in their beta (especially if their pre-inclusion beta is low) and in the extent to which market returns explain firm stock returns (R2). Stock turnover and analyst coverage also typically increase upon inclusion. Various empirical tests suggest that the category/habitat views of Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler explain most of these results, although information-related factors also account for some findings.

We examine the effects of bank–firm relationships on firm performance in Japan. When access to capital markets is limited, close bank–firm ties increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms, but do not lead to higher profitability or growth. The cost of capital of firms with close bank ties is higher than that of their peers. This indicates that most of the benefits from these relationships are appropriated by the banks. Finally, the slow growth rates of bank clients suggest that banks discourage firms from investing in risky, profitable projects. However, liberalization of financial markets reduces the banks' market power.

A central challenge in the regulation of controlled firms is curbing rent extraction by controllers. As independent directors and fiduciary duties are often insufficient, some jurisdictions give minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions. To assess these rights’ effectiveness, we exploit a 2011 Israeli reform that gave minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions, including the pay of controllers and their relatives (“controller executives”). We find that the reform curbed controller-executive pay and led some controller executives to resign or go with little or no pay in circumstances suggesting their pay would be rejected. These findings suggest that minority veto rights can be an effective corporate governance tool.

Diversified business groups, consisting of legally independent firms operating across diverse industries, are ubiquitous in emerging markets. Groups around the world share certain attributes but also vary substantially in structure, ownership, and other dimensions. This paper proposes a business group taxonomy, which is used to formulate hypotheses and present evidence about the reasons for the formation, prevalence, and evolution of groups in different environments. In interpreting the evidence, the authors pay particular attention to two aspects neglected in much of the literature: the circumstances under which groups emerge and the historical evidence on some of the questions addressed by recent studies. They argue that business groups are responses to different economic conditions and that, from a welfare standpoint, they can sometimes be “paragons” and, at other times, “parasites.” The authors conclude with an agenda for future research.

We study the effects of a regulatory change that induced the unification of most dual class shares in Israel in the 1990s. Specifically, we follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 companies that unified their dual-class shares, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting rights they incurred upon unification by: 1) increasing their holdings prior to the unification (ex-ante preparation), and 2) by buying shares afterwards; by the end of the sample period their voting power was only marginally lower than in the control sample. This offsetting result suggests that marginal voting rights may be important to controlling shareholders even beyond the 50% threshold. Second, share unifications were not associated with much change in the identity of controlling shareholders. Third, the proportion of firms affiliated with pyramidal business groups in the sample of unifying firms was lower than in the population of listed firms as a whole and not different from that in the control sample, suggesting that pyramidal ownership structures did not replace dual class shares. Finally, unifying firms did not exhibit a substantial improvement in their performance and valuation in comparison with the control sample.

We calculate abnormal stock returns for Japanese non-financial companies around major events associated with the banking crisis (1995–2000), and find that not all companies were equally sensitive to the malaise of the banking sector: the most affected were small, leveraged, low-tech companies with low credit ratings and low market to book ratios. This is consistent with “credit crunch” theories (companies with limited access to financial markets are sensitive to changes in bank lending) and with claims that innovation is rarely financed by bank debt. We do not find much evidence on the alleged misallocation of loans to support ailing bank clients.