Abstract This study examines whether the revised lease standards (ASC 842 and IFRS 16) make U.S. GAAP-based accounting amounts more comparable with IFRS-based accounting amounts. Our study is motivated by the FASB and the IASB’s call for research on the comparability of the revised lease standards. We find that U.S. GAAP and IFRS pairs that are high operating lease users experience a larger increase in accounting comparability after the adoption of revised lease standards than low operating lease U.S. GAAP-IFRS pairs. Additionally, our results suggest that the improvement comes more from the changes to the balance sheet rather than the income statement and is more pronounced for IFRS firms from countries with stronger accounting enforcement. Lastly, we show that analysts who are more GAAP-focused (IFRS-focused) prior to the standard change are more likely to increase their forecasting of book value per share for IFRS (U.S. GAAP) firms.

ABSTRACT Using a natural experiment (the SEC's 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program), we investigate the effects of an increase in tick size on financial reporting quality. The tick size pilot program reduces algorithmic trading (AT) and increases fundamental investors’ information acquisition and trading activities. This in turn increases the scrutiny of managers’ financial reporting choices and reduces their incentives to engage in misreporting. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find a significant decrease in the magnitude of discretionary accruals, a significant reduction in the likelihood of just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, and a marginally significant decrease in restatements for the treated firms in the pilot program. Furthermore, we find that the change in financial reporting quality is concentrated in treated firms experiencing decreases in AT and increases in information acquisition activities. We also find that the mispricing of accruals is significantly lower for treated firms. Taken together, our results suggest that an increase in tick size has a causal effect on firms’ financial reporting quality.