In this paper, we present economic forces that affect the closed-end fund share price using a simple two-period model with limited participation. We characterize three economic forces: management fee, principal-agent problem effect and diversification benefit effect. The role of the management fee is consistent with recent studies by Ross [Ross S., 2002. Neoclassical finance, alternative finance and the closed end fund puzzle. European Financial Management 8, 129–137, Ross, S., 2002. A neoclassical look at behavioral finance: closed end funds. The Princeton lectures in finance III] and findings of various empirical studies [e.g., Kumar, R., Noronha, G.M., 1992. A re-examination of the relationship between closed-end fund discounts and expenses. Journal of Financial Research 15(2) Summer, 139–147; Russel, P.S., 2005. Closed-end fund pricing: The puzzle, the explanations, and some new evidence, Journal of Business and Economic Studies 11(1), 34–49; Gemmill, G., Thomas, D.C., 2002. Noise trading, costly arbitrage, and asset prices: Evidence from closed end funds. Journal of Finance 57(6), 2571–2594]. The model’s principal-agent problem effect is consistent with empirical findings by Brickley et al. [Brickley, James, Steven Manaster, Schallheim, James, 1991. The tax-timing option and the discounts on closed-end investment companies. Journal of Business 64, 287–312] of positive relation between the fund discount and the average variance of the constituent assets in the fund portfolio. In addition, it provides a theoretical framework for empirical studies, which examine the role of agency costs [Barclay, Michael J., Clifford G. Holderness, Jeffrey Pontiff, 1993. Private benefits from block ownership and discounts on closed-end funds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 263–291] and compensation contracts [Coles, J., Suay, J., Woodbury, D., 2000. Fund advisor compensation in closed-end funds. Journal of Finance 55 (3), 1385–1414; Deli, Daniel N., 2002. Mutual fund advisory contracts: An empirical Investigation. Journal of Finance 57(1), 109–133] on the behavior of fund managers and fund discounts. The model’s diversification benefit effect supports the result in [Bonser-Neal C., Brauer,G., Neal, R.., Wheatley, S., 1990. International investment restrictions and closed-end country fund prices. Journal of Finance 45, 523–547] that announcement of financial market liberalization is associated with a decrease in the fund premium. It also supports the findings of [Kumar, R., Noronha, G.M., 1992. A re-examination of the relationship between closed-end fund discounts and expenses. Journal of Financial Research 15(2) Summer, 139–147; Chay, J.B., Trzcinka, Charles A., 1999. Managerial performance and the cross-sectional pricing of closed-end funds. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 379–408] of a positive relation between current premium and the risk-adjusted return over the following year.

The informational role of prices contributes positively to their variability. In a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, traders rationally respond to price changes by revising their estimates of other traders' private signals and hence their own expectations of future dividends. The resultant shifts in traders' demands amplify any supply shock-induced price changes. We develop an infinite horizon noisy rational expectations model and calibrate, simulate, and test it using U.S. stock market data. The price variability in a heterogeneous information economy is shown to be 20% to 46% higher than in an otherwise equivalent economy in which all signals are publicly announced.

In this study we examine the temporal dynamics of dealer market share and their ramification for competition and trading costs using a large sample of NASDAQ securities. Our results show that although the total market share of the top five dealers is relatively stable over time, there is significant monthly variation in the composition of the top five dealers. We show that market share turbulence among top dealers is another form of competition that narrows bid–ask spreads, especially for stocks with less competitive market structure.