This study shows the influence of investor sentiment on the market's mean–variance tradeoff. We find that the stock market's expected excess return is positively related to the market's conditional variance in low-sentiment periods but unrelated to variance in high-sentiment periods. These findings are consistent with sentiment traders who, during the high-sentiment periods, undermine an otherwise positive mean–variance tradeoff. We also find that the negative correlation between returns and contemporaneous volatility innovations is much stronger in the low-sentiment periods. The latter result is consistent with the stronger positive ex ante relation during such periods.

This paper examines the relation between corporate lobbying and fraud detection. Using data on corporate lobbying expenses between 1998 and 2004, and a sample of large frauds detected during the same period, we find that firms’ lobbying activities make a significant difference in fraud detection: Compared to nonlobbying firms, on average, firms that lobby have a significantly lower hazard rate of being detected for fraud, evade fraud detection 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by regulators. In addition, fraudulent firms on average spend 77% more on lobbying than nonfraudulent firms, and they spend 29% more on lobbying during their fraudulent periods than during nonfraudulent periods. The delay in detection leads to a greater distortion in resource allocation during fraudulent periods. It also allows managers to sell more of their shares.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the economic impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by studying foreign firms? choice of whether to issue bonds in the U.S. public bond market or elsewhere before and after the law's enactment in 2002. After controlling for firm characteristics, bond features, home-country attributes, and market conditions, I find that foreign firms rely less on the U.S. public bond market after SOX. Additionally, some determinants of choosing the U.S. public bond market have changed since the passage of SOX: firms listing equities on U.S. stock exchanges, adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and doing large bond issuances are more likely to choose this market in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. Overall, these results are consistent with a shift in the expected costs and benefits of choosing the U.S. public bond market following SOX. This paper provides the first evidence about how SOX influences debt financing decisions and alters capital flows across international bond markets.

This paper provides evidence that portfolio disagreement measured bottom-up from individual-stock analyst forecast dispersions has a number of asset pricing implications. For the market portfolio, market disagreement mean-reverts and is negatively related to ex post expected market return. Contemporaneously, an increase in market disagreement manifests as a drop in discount rate. For book-to-market sorted portfolios, the value premium is stronger among high disagreement stocks. The underperformance by high disagreement stocks is stronger among growth stocks. Growth stocks are more sensitive to variations in disagreement relative to value stocks. These findings are consistent with asset pricing theory incorporating belief dispersion.

[We find a positive association between short selling and accruals during 1988—2009, and that asymmetry between the up- and downsides of the accrual anomaly is stronger when constraints on short arbitrage are more severe (low availability of loanable shares as proxied by institutional holdings). Short arbitrage occurs primarily among firms in the top accrual decile. Asymmetry is present only on NASDAQ. Thus, there is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, but short-sale constraints limit its effectiveness.]

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ information environment. To control for the effect of confounding concurrent events, we use a control sample of firms that had already voluntarily adopted IFRS at least two years prior to the mandatory adoption date. We find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion decrease relative to this control sample only for those mandatory IFRS adopters domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Furthermore, for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both weak enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, we find that forecast errors and dispersion decrease more for firms with stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. These results highlight the important roles of enforcement regimes and firm‐level reporting incentives in determining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption.

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.

In 2005–2008, over a dozen put warrants traded in China went so deep out of the money that they were almost certain to expire worthless. Nonetheless, each warrant was traded more than three times each day at substantially inflated prices. This bubble is unique in that the underlying stock prices make warrant fundamentals publicly observable and that warrants have predetermined finite maturities. This sample allows us to examine a set of bubble theories. In particular, our analysis highlights the joint effects of short-sales constraints and heterogeneous beliefs in driving bubbles and confirms several key findings of the experimental bubble literature. (JEL G12, G13, O16, P34)

We extend standard models of conditional earnings conservatism and adaptation value to the context of the corporate refocusing activities of UK listed companies. This analysis is interesting because refocusing activities are: (1) commonly anticipated by significant negative returns in the financial year(s) before the refocusing event; (2) typically associated with large material charges; and (3) likely to be part of a strategic plan with the internal decision preceding the formal public announcement. We complement Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] by showing how their nonlinear relation between share prices and earnings changes around refocusing events as adaptation options are exercised. Because refocusing events also involve large realized losses and major changes to firms’ strategic plans, we expect to see systematic changes in the timing relations between stock returns and reported earnings. To capture this, we show how the coefficients of Basu's [1997] model of conditional conservatism change around refocusing events.