We propose to impose a weighted l1 and squared l2 norm penalty on the portfolio weights to improve out-of-sample (OOS) performances of portfolio optimization when the number of assets becomes large. We show that under certain conditions, the realized risk of the optimal minimum variance portfolio (MVP) obtained from the strategy can asymptotically be lower than those of benchmark portfolios with a high probability. Our theoretical results imply that penalty parameters for the weighted-norm penalty can be specified as a simple function of the number of assets and sample size. With the theoretical results, we also develop an automatic calibration procedure for choosing the penalty parameters. We demonstrate superior OOS performances of the weighted-norm MVP with two real data sets. Finally, we propose several alternative norm penalties and show that their OOS performances are comparable to the weighted-norm strategy.

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital (VC) firm׳s reputation is affected when it fails to prevent fraud in its portfolio companies. We find that reputation-damaged VCs interact differently in the future with their limited partners, other VCs, and IPO underwriters because they are perceived as ineffective monitors. In addition, VCs that fail to prevent fraud experience greater difficulty in taking future portfolio companies public.

We explore the link between open-market share repurchases (OMRs) and asymmetric information based on financial reporting quality and find that opaque firms experience positive abnormal returns of twice the magnitude of those of transparent firms. These significant differences remain after controlling for governance, earnings management, and firm characteristics. We document significantly positive long-run postannouncement returns for opaque firms, but not for transparent firms. We find that takeover activity and premiums rise with repurchase activity by opaque firms, which may explain some of the wealth effects. Our results suggest that asymmetric information plays an important role in the wealth effects around OMRs.

Using firm‐level data from 23 developed markets, we document a positive association between overall firm‐level governance quality and the informativeness of earnings announcements measured by abnormal stock return variance. This finding is robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of firm‐level corporate governance. Further analyses reveal that firms with strong governance show little evidence of earnings management, appoint Big 4 auditing firms, and attract analyst following, implying a positive link between strong corporate governance and the information quality of earnings announcements. Finally, there is some evidence that the relation between firm‐level governance and market reactions around the announcements exists only in countries characterized by a transparent information environment and strong legal investor protection.

In this paper, we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks’ financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress? We find a significant cross‐sectional association between banks’ 2006 Q4 financial information and bank failures over 2008–2010, suggesting that the financial statements reflected at least some of the increased risk of bank distress in advance. The mean abnormal short interest in our sample of banks increased from 0.66 percent in March 2005 to 2.4 percent in March 2007 and the association between short interest and leading financial statement indicators also increased. In contrast, we observe neither a meaningful change in analysts’ recommendations, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and audit fees nor an increased sensitivity of these actions to financial indicators of bank distress over this time period. Our results suggest that actions of short sellers likely provided an early warning of the banks’ upcoming distress prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

This paper investigates the impact of unconventional monetary policy on firm financial constraints using the maturity extension program (MEP). Consistent with bond market segmentation and limits to arbitrage, around the MEP's announcement, stock prices rose for those firms more dependent on longer-term debt. These firms also issued more long-term debt during the MEP and expanded employment and investment. There is also evidence of “reach for yield” behavior, as the demand for riskier corporate debt also increased. Our results suggest that unconventional monetary policy might have relaxed financial constraints for some firms by inducing gap-filling behavior and affecting bond market risk premia.

We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler’s (1964) model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals. For a fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria with “cheap talk” that result in near-perfect collusion, whereas all equilibria without such communication are bounded away from this outcome. In our model, communication improves monitoring and leads to higher prices and profits. (JEL C73, D43, D83, L12, L13, L25)

Surprisingly little is known about the business cycle dynamics of leverage. The existing evidence documents that target leverage evolves pro-cyclically either for all firms or financially constrained ones. In contrast, we show that, on average, target leverage ratios evolve counter-cyclically once cyclicality is measured comprehensively, accounting for variation in explanatory variables and model parameters. These counter-cyclical dynamics are robust to different subsamples of firms, data samples, empirical models of leverage, and definitions of leverage. There is a fraction of 10–25% of firms with pro-cyclical dynamics whose characteristics are consistent with counter-cyclical dynamics for loss-given-default and probability of default.

Firms can effectively stave off outside takeover bids using private investments in public equity (PIPEs) when they face strong takeover pressure. Greater takeover pressure makes PIPE issuers more likely to grant investors large blocks of shares, price discounts, generous dividends, and board seats. Takeover pressure also encourages issuers to place more shares with friendly investors such as managerial investors and strategic alliance investors. The evidence is consistent with the regular methods of the white squire defense. PIPEs can be a preferred method in the choice of a white squire defense when poorly performing and highly overleveraged firms face severe takeover pressure. There is a negative relation between takeover probability and post-issue performance of issuers, which supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis over the shareholder interest hypothesis. Therefore PIPEs can increase, not mitigate, agency problems.