Market-wide attention-grabbing events — record levels for the Dow and front-page articles about the stock market — predict the trading behavior of investors and, in turn, market returns. Both aggregate and household-level data reveal that high market-wide attention events lead investors to sell their stock holdings dramatically when the level of the stock market is high. Such aggressive selling has a negative impact on market prices, reducing market returns by 19 basis points on days following attention-grabbing events.

The paper proposes a self-exciting asset pricing model that takes into account co-jumps between prices and volatility and self-exciting jump clustering. We employ a Bayesian learning approach to implement real-time sequential analysis. We find evidence of self-exciting jump clustering since the 1987 market crash, and its importance becomes more obvious at the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. We also find that learning affects the tail behaviors of the return distributions and has important implications for risk management, volatility forecasting, and option pricing.

Formal finance involves the costly acquisition of information about distant entrepreneurs, while relationship-based finance allows financiers to fund a narrow circle of close entrepreneurs without acquiring costly information. In developing economies with low capital endowments, relationship-based finance is optimal because only high-quality entrepreneurs receive funding. However, formal finance may emerge in equilibrium, and it has the only effect of shifting rents from entrepreneurs to financiers. In more-developed economies with higher capital endowments, formal finance becomes necessary to prevent funding of low-quality entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, relationship-based financing may persist in equilibrium, and low-quality close entrepreneurs are funded even when there are high-quality distant entrepreneurs.

This paper investigates the impact of CEOs' career experiences on corporate investment decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs with more diverse career experiences are less likely to be constrained by insufficient internal capital. The potential mechanism is that rich external experiences help CEOs accumulate social connections and these connections mitigate information asymmetry and lead to better access to external funds. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with CEOs who have more diverse career experiences exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivity and exploit more outside funds, including both bank loans and trade credit. These effects are more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Even controlling for connections gained through financial institutions or government offices, the effect of diversity still remains very strong. Finally, we conduct several tests to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by the endogeneity of CEOs' appointments.

We hypothesize that cognitive limitation may be manifested in a disproportionately large volume of limit orders submitted at round-number prices if investors use these numbers as cognitive shortcuts. Using detailed limit order data in the Taiwan Futures Exchange, we find that investors with lower cognitive abilities, defined as higher limit order submission ratios at round numbers, suffer greater losses in their round-numbered and non-round-numbered limit orders, market orders, and round-trip trades. The positive correlation between cognitive ability and investment performance is monotonic and robust across futures and options markets. In addition, past trading experience helps mitigate cognitive limitation.

ABSTRACT Buying is easier than shorting for many equity investors. Combining this arbitrage asymmetry with the arbitrage risk represented by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) explains the negative relation between IVOL and average return. The IVOL‐return relation is negative among overpriced stocks but positive among underpriced stocks, with mispricing determined by combining 11 return anomalies. Consistent with arbitrage asymmetry, the negative relation among overpriced stocks is stronger, especially for stocks less easily shorted, so the overall IVOL‐return relation is negative. Further supporting our explanation, high investor sentiment weakens the positive relation among underpriced stocks and, especially, strengthens the negative relation among overpriced stocks.

We examine whether informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. The measure is motivated by prior studies arguing that a mutual fund is skilled if it buys stocks with subsequent high earnings announcement returns. We find that this measure predicts future mutual fund returns. On average, after adjusting for Carhart’s four risk factors, the top decile of mutual funds outperforms the bottom decile by 44 basis points per quarter. By decomposing fund alphas into two components in their relations to earnings, we find that this measure is only associated with earnings-related fund alphas. This measure can also be used to predict stock returns at future earnings announcements.

We propose a unified model of limited market integration, asset-price determination, leveraging, and contagion. Investors and firms are located on a circle, and access to markets involves participation costs that increase with distance. Due to a complementarity between participation and leverage decisions, the equilibrium may exhibit diverse leverage and participation choices across investors, although investors are ex ante identical. Small changes in market-access costs can cause a change in the type of equilibrium, leading to discontinuous price changes, deleveraging, and portfolio-flow reversals. Moreover, the market is subject to contagion—an adverse shock to investors in some locations affects prices everywhere. (JEL D83, G11, G12, G32, G35)