Trade credit can serve as a collusion mechanism for competing supply chains to increase producer surplus in medium concentrated industries. We analyze theoretically how this form of financing influences retailers’ behavior in the product market, study incentives to deviate, and show evidence consistent with the model’s predictions. Trade credit use is inversely U shaped in industry concentration, and this pattern is more pronounced in industries more prone to collusion and when incentives to deviate are smaller.

Boards of directors play their role in corporate governance by advising and/or monitoring managers. In the corporate disclosure literature, prior research has documented directors' monitoring role, yet empirical evidence on directors' advising role is limited. Since the advising role often entails information transfer, we examine directors who concurrently serve as directors or executives in the firms' related industries (DRIs) and hence possess valuable information about the firms' external operating environment. We hypothesize and find that more DRIs on boards are associated with more accurate management forecasts. This association is stronger when firms face greater uncertainty, and holds in settings where DRIs are unlikely to monitor managers, suggesting a distinct advising role of DRIs. Our study highlights directors' role as information suppliers and advisors who help shape corporate voluntary disclosure.

Using time stamps of Standard & Poor's rating changes, we examine the timing of rating changes in an intraday setting. Our evidence shows that although most rating changes occur during trading hours, the proportion of downgrades announced after regular trading hours is higher than that of upgrades. In addition, unexpected after-hour downgrades are associated with more negative stock returns and lower trading volume in comparison to those announced during trading hours. We also find that Standard & Poor's is more likely to announce downgrades after hours when downgrades are released on busy days with many concurrent rating announcements, when they concern financial firms, and when they are unexpected. In addition, Egan-Jones Ratings (EJR), an investor-paid credit rating agency, demonstrates a similar tendency in announcing downgrades after trading hours. This is the first study to document systematic differences in the timing of credit rating changes announced before and after the market closes. Our findings suggest that Standard & Poor's announces downgrades after trading hours to better disseminate information, and thus have important policy implications.