This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto-preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto‐preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.

We develop an analytical model to address the question of optimal deposit insurance policy and to examine the impact of deregulation on depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. We find that the optimal level of regulation depends critically on the functional relationship between risk and return. We show that in general deregulation of bank activities and/or of deposit rate ceilings will in volve tradeoff between depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. Our analysis also indicates that risk‐sensitive premium and capital requirement schedules may not be efficient in managing the risk of banks.

We develop an analytical model to address the question of optimal deposit insurance policy and to examine the impact of deregulation on depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. We find that the optimal level of regulation depends critically on the functional relationship between risk and return. We show that in general deregulation of bank activities and/or of deposit rate ceilings will in volve tradeoff between depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. Our analysis also indicates that risk-sensitive premium and capital requirement schedules may not be efficient in managing the risk of banks.

This paper extends the seminal work of Akerlof, and Salop and Stiglitz in two directions: (i) the sellers can select both the selling prices and quality levels of their good, and (ii) the buyers can acquire price/quality information about individual sellers at a cost. We observe multiple price/quality combinations in equilibrium, which depend upon the distribution of information costs of consumers and upon whether quality, or price, or both are costly observable. Welfare comparisons of equilibrium are considered. We show that welfare will be greater when price advertising is permitted.

The authors analyze risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard. Without deposit-linked subsidies, it is impossible to implement risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive, deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy. The authors establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital; the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well. This suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk-sensitive deposit insurance.

The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well-known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high-quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high-quality borrowers may put up more collateral.

The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well‐known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high‐quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high‐quality borrowers may put up more collateral.