This paper provides early evidence on the effect of global regulation mandating a switch from loan loss provisioning (LLP) based on incurred credit losses (ICLs) to LLP based on expected credit losses (ECLs). Using a sample of systemically important banks from 74 countries, we find that ECL provisions are more predictive of future bank risk than ICL provisions. Corroborating that the switch to ECL provisioning results in more information to assess bank risk, we also observe that the announcement of a larger first‐time impact of the accounting change elicits lower stock returns and higher changes in credit default swap spreads. Critically, these patterns are most pronounced when credit conditions deteriorate. Additional analyses show that the higher information content of the ECL model stems from the provisions for nondefaulted loans, which did not exist under ICL. Our study contributes to the debate on the effect of the ECL model on procyclicality, an especially pressing issue in the context of the current pandemic.

Can voluntary market-based initiatives effectively promote greener credit allocation? Our paper addresses this question by assessing the role of self-declared environmentally conscious bank shareholders, specifically those endorsing the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, in shaping the sustainability of bank loan portfolios. For our analysis, we utilize a comprehensive dataset that includes information on syndicated loans, firm-level emissions, and both bank and firm ownership and financial data. Controlling for loan demand, at the bank–firm level, we find no evidence of an association between a higher ownership stake by eco-conscious bank shareholders and shifts in banks’ loan allocation strategies between firms with low and high emissions. At the firm-level, we find that lending relationships with banks characterized by greater eco-conscious ownership are not associated with significantly improved environmental performance among borrower firms. Our analysis reveals that banks are treated differently by investors compared to non-financial firms, likely due to regulatory requirements and their unique governance structures, which might explain the observed lack of influence of eco-conscious bank shareholders. Our findings thus indicate the potential limitations of relying on self-declared eco-conscious bank shareholders to guide banks toward environmentally sustainable credit allocation.