This paper examines the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability and provides an assessment of the implications of banks’ risk management practices for monetary policy. By considering the desire of the central bank to stabilize different types of the “basis” risk as a contribution to financial stability, we derive a set of plausible interest-rate rules characterized by either backward or forward interest-rate smoothing. The paper investigates the determinacy conditions of the rational expectations equilibria obtained under such rules. Contrary to what previously found in the literature, we find that the practice of smoothing interest rates backward does not in general alleviate problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. Moreover, basis risk stabilization may lead to policy rules embedding “forward” interest-rate smoothing, where a new kind of indeterminacy may arise following excessive concern for financial stability.

In his recent paper in the American Economic Review, Jensen (1997) argues that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates it. ∗We acknowledge with thanks support for this work provided through ESRC research grant L138251003 “Imperfect Financial Markets, Business Cycles, and Growth”, which forms part of the programme on Understanding the Evolving Macroeconomy (UEM). We are grateful to participants at the Money, Macro and Finance (MMF), and UEM Conference 2002 for their helpful comments. We thank also the editors and referees of this journal for their advice and suggestions. An Appendix containing details of algebraic derivations in Section 4 of this paper can be found on the AER web site and on the authors’ site at www.econ.bbk.ac.uk/faculty/driffill 1 He examines a government that delegates monetary policy to an in-dependent central bank, and that faces costs if it interferes in the policy decisions of the bank by appointing a new central banker to obtain a preferred result. He shows that delegation makes it more dif-ficult to sustain the credibility of optimal monetary policy. We show here that this result emerges because Jensen examines a restricted range of policy actions for the government. When this restriction is lifted, the result is reversed. By means of suitable announcements of contracts for the central bank, combined with appropriate actually implemented contracts, delegated policy enables zero inflation to pre-vail in economies in which it could not do so without delegated policy. These economies are ones that have relatively low discount factors.

This paper examines interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. There is a general view that central banks smooth interest rate changes to enhance the stability of financial markets. But might this induce a moral hazard problem, and induce financial institutions to maintain riskier portfolios, the presence of which would further inhibit active monetary policy? Hedging activities of financial institutions, such as the use of interest rate futures and swap markets to reduce risk, should further protect markets against consequences of unforeseen interest rate changes. Thus, smoothing may be both unnecessary and undesirable. The paper shows by a theoretical argument that smoothing interest rates may lead to indeterminacy of the economy's rational expectations equilibrium. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis supports the view that the Federal Reserve smoothes interest rates and reacts to interest rate futures. We add new evidence on the importance for policy of alternative indicators of financial markets stress.

We examine the role played by Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs) in the lending policies undertaken by banks at the peak of the Great Crisis of 2007–2009. We address this issue by using a large database on Italian firms built from the credit files of UniCredit banking Group and focusing on small business. We provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of the probability that a borrowing firm will suffer financial tension and obtain two main innovative findings. First, we find that small firms supported by MGIs less likely experienced financial tensions even at that time of utmost financial stress. Second, our empirical evidence shows that MGIs played a signaling role beyond the simple provision of collateral. This latter finding suggests that the information provided by MGIs turned out to be key for bank–firm relations as scoring and rating systems – being typically based on pro-cyclical indicators – had become less informative during the crisis.

This paper investigates SME financing in Italy. The literature distinguishes between two main different lending technologies (LTs) for SMEs: transactional and relationship LTs. We find that banks lend to SMEs by using both LTs together, independently of the size and proximity of borrowers. Moreover, we show that the use of soft information decreases the probability of firms being credit rationed. Finally, we find that more soft information is produced when the bank uses relationship LT as primary technology individually or coupled with transactional LT. Our results support the view that LTs can be complementary, but reject the hypothesis that substitutability among LTs is somehow possible for outsiders by means of hardening of soft information.