We document an unprecedented brain drain of Artificial Intelligence (AI) professors from universities from 2004 to 2018. We find that students from the affected universities establish fewer AI startups and raise less funding. The brain‐drain effect is significant for tenured professors, professors from top universities, and deep‐learning professors. Additional evidence suggests that unobserved city‐ and university‐level shocks are unlikely to drive our results. We consider several economic channels for the findings. The most consistent explanation is that professors' departures reduce startup founders' AI knowledge, which we find is an important factor for successful startup formation and fundraising.

This study investigates whether and to what extent bank control over firms by their representation on boards of directors and by equity holdings through trust business may affect corporate environmental responsibility. Using a large sample of listed firms in the United States from 2004 to 2016, we find that banker directors with equity affiliation improve firms’ environmental performance scores and such impact is associated with affiliated bank’s shareholdings, investment horizon, and environmental orientation. Additionally, we document that the effects of bank control on firm’s environmental investments is stronger for firms with more short-term institutional investors but weaker for firms with more analyst coverage. Moreover, we find that when firms are financially constrained, banker directors reduce environmental investments. Finally, product-market competition matters for a firm’s environmental strategies as the relation of bank control and environmental investments is more profound under conditions of greater industry competition.

This paper investigates how the regulation of bank wealth management products (WMPs) affects corporate innovation. We build a concise model linking firms’ assets allocation decisions to regulatory variables affecting banks. The model suggests that current WMP regulation can enhance formal lending and stimulate innovation among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while having no impact on innovation in private enterprises (PEs). Empirically, we identify firms’ exposure to bank regulation by examining the number of WMPs issued by banks in 2017 and the distance between banks and firms. Our results indicate that innovation output significantly increased for highly exposed SOEs, while there was no significant change for PEs. Using city-level data, we further observe that regulation fosters innovation in regions with higher exposure. Our findings suggest that regulation exerts heterogeneous effects on the real economy by banks’ credit allocation and firms’ investment strategies.