Mortgage dollar roll, the most common financing strategy for agency MBS, differs from repo in that the returned collateral can differ from those received. Also, MBS ownership changes hands in the funding period. We show that dollar roll “specialness,” how much implied financing rates fall below MBS repo rates, (1) increases in the value of the cheapest-to-deliver option, (2) decreases in the leverage of primary dealers, (3) decreases in prepayment risk exposure during the financing period, and (4) decreases in MBS returns. The Federal Reserve’s dollar roll sales in quantitative easing operations are associated with lower specialness. Received February 3, 2016; editorial decision July 30, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

We examine the introduction of mandatory post-trade reporting in the To-Be-Announced mortgage-backed securities market. With post-trade reporting, trading costs fell for institutional investors. Trading costs declined more for investors’ trades with peripheral dealers than for their trades with core dealers. Peripheral dealers’ market share dropped after the introduction of post-trade reporting, suggesting that opacity was protecting inefficient high-cost dealers. Interdealer trades and volume declined as transparency made it easier to find natural counterparties. Relationships between dealers became less important and, after controlling for the number of trades, dealers used more counterparties in interdealer trades.