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Foreign institutional ownership and the speed of leverage adjustment: International evidence

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 68, 101966 open access
Employing a large sample of 7246 firms across 38 economies from 2000 to 2013, we show a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership (FIO) and firms' speed of leverage adjustment. This positive relation is concentrated for over-leveraged firms that need to decrease financial leverage to rebalance their capital structures. We validate our findings using a 2SLS regression and a DiD estimation to exploit the exogenous variations in FIO generated by the inclusion of MSCI membership and the passage of the JGTRRA. These results suggest that foreign institutional investors play an important monitoring role in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Overall, this paper lends support to the dynamic trade-off theory.

Does media coverage deter firms from withholding bad news? Evidence from stock price crash risk

Journal of Corporate Finance 2020 64, 101664 open access
Spurred by the informational and disciplinary roles that the media fulfils, this study provides initial evidence on how higher media coverage is associated with a lower tendency of firms withholding bad news, proxied by stock price crash risk. Our main findings are robust to a battery of tests that account for endogeneity concerns including a difference-in-differences analysis based on newspaper closures that exogenously reduce media coverage and a regression-discontinuity design analysis based on the top band of Russell 2000 and lower band of Russell 1000 index stocks. Additional tests reveal that the negative relation between media coverage and stock price crash risk is concentrated within firms with more negative and novel news coverage and firms with higher litigation or reputation risks. We also find that media plays an important role in reducing future stock price crash risk when there is reduced monitoring by other external monitoring mechanisms such as external auditors, financial analysts, and institutional shareholders.