I develop a model of real exchange rate determination that attributes a central role to the intertemporal government budget condition, which equates the market value of government debt to the present value of government surpluses. To enforce this equilibrium condition in the presence of nominal rigidities, the real exchange rate has to adjust in response to shocks to government surpluses. The model predicts that fiscal shocks account for real exchange rate movements, and the factor structure in fiscal shocks aligns with the factor structure in currency returns. Both predictions are confirmed in the sample of developed countries.

We show that exchange rate correlations tend to be explained by the global trade network while consumption correlations tend to be explained by productivity correlations. Sharing common trade linkages with other countries increases exchange rate correlations beyond bilateral linkages. We explain these findings using a model of the global trade network with market segmentation. Interdependent global production generates international comovements, while market segmentation disconnects the drivers of exchange rate correlations from the drivers of consumption correlations. Moreover, we show that the trade network generates common factors found in exchange rates. Our findings offer a trade-based account of the origins of international comovements and shed light on important frictions in international markets.

We develop a model of the global financial cycle with one key ingredient: the international demand for safe dollar assets. The model matches patterns of dollar borrowing and currency mismatch, the U.S. external balance sheet, exorbitant privilege, spillovers of the U.S. monetary policy to the rest of the world, and the dollar as a global risk factor. In doing so, we lay out a novel transmission mechanism through which the U.S. monetary policy affects the currency market and the global economy. The global financial cycle is a dollar cycle.

We find that central bank reserves injected by QE crowd out bank lending. We estimate a structural model with cross-sectional instrumental variables for deposit and loan demand. Our results are determined by the elasticity of loan demand and the impact of reserve holdings on the cost of supplying loans. The reserves injected by QE raise loan rates by 7.4 basis points, and each dollar of reserves reduces bank lending by 7.7 cents. Our results imply that a large injection of central bank reserves has the unintended consequence of crowding out bank loans because of bank balance sheet costs.

In a monetary union, the risk-free rate cannot adjust to country-level fiscal positions, leaving only default spreads and convenience yields to respond. Empirically, we find that convenience yields explain a large share of the variation in eurozone (EZ) sovereign bond yields. EZ sovereign bonds earn larger convenience yields when their governments run larger surpluses. Since convenience yields generate substantial seigniorage revenue from debt issuance, our estimates imply economically large fiscal costs from low convenience yields for peripheral countries in the EZ.

We attribute variation in the strength of the U.S. dollar and its covariance with other currencies to economic primitives using a global asset demand system. We take global investor savings, asset supply, and monetary policy as exogenous primitives, and show how these variables explain dollar exchange rate behavior. Prior to the global financial crisis, global savings and demand shifts explain dollar depreciation, whereas post-crisis they explain dollar appreciation. Interest rates and cross-border bank loans explain short-term fluctuations in the dollar, but decline in significance over longer horizons. When explaining the dollar factor structure, we find that global savings explain common variations across dollar exchange rates, whereas investor demand shifts account for cross-sectional heterogeneity in dollar betas.

We develop a theory that links the U.S. dollar's valuation in FX markets to the convenience yield that foreign investors derive from holding U.S. safe assets. We show that this convenience yield can be inferred from the Treasury basis, the yield gap between U.S. government and currency‐hedged foreign government bonds. Consistent with the theory, a widening of the basis coincides with an immediate appreciation and a subsequent depreciation of the dollar. Our results lend empirical support to models that impute a special role to the United States as the world's provider of safe assets and the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

We survey thousands of affluent American investors to examine the relationship between personalities and investment decisions. The Big Five personality traits correlate with investors' beliefs about the stock market and economy, risk preferences, and social interaction tendencies. Two personality traits, Neuroticism and Openness, stand out in their explanatory power for equity investments. Investors with high Neuroticism and those with low Openness tend to allocate less investment to equities. We examine the underlying mechanisms and find evidence for both standard channels of preferences and beliefs and other nonstandard channels. We show consistent out-of-sample evidence in representative panels of Australian and German households.

We use a portfolio‐based framework to understand what drives the decline of the U.S. net foreign asset (NFA) position and the reversal in returns earned on the U.S. NFA (exorbitant privilege). We show that global savings gluts and monetary policies widened the U.S. NFA position, while investor demand shifts partially offset this widening. Moreover, U.S. privilege declined after 2010, in line with increasing foreign demand for U.S. equity. We also highlight a quantity dimension of the U.S. privilege: The U.S. can issue substantially more debt than other countries for a given yield increase.