Fractional trading (FT)—the ability to trade less than a whole share—removes barriers to high-priced stocks and facilitates entry by capital-constrained retail investors. We observe a surge of tiny trades, measured using off-exchange one-share trades, among high-priced stocks compared to low-priced stocks after FT is introduced to the U.S. equity markets. These tiny trades, when coordinated during attention-grabbing events, are forceful enough to exert large price pressure on high-priced stocks. Further evidence suggests that FT can even fuel meme-stock-like trading frenzies and bubbles in high-priced stocks, for which the feedback effect likely plays a role.

Order flow segmentation prevents direct interactions between U.S. retail and institutional investors. Using the imbalance in observable internalized retail trades, we show wholesalers use retail flow to provide liquidity to institutional investors, especially when liquidity is scarce. Our institutional liquidity cost ( $ ILC $ ) measures average absolute retail trade imbalances, positing that institutions holding stocks with greater such averages more often resort to the expensive wholesaler-provided liquidity. $ ILC $ is correlated with expected institutional price impacts. Unlike existing illiquidity measures, $ ILC $ has economically meaningful relations with institutional holding horizons and yields annualized liquidity premia of 2.7%–3.2% post-2010, even after excluding microcap stocks.

We analyze minute‐by‐minute Bloomberg online status and study how the effort provision of executives in public corporations affects firm value. While executives spend most of their time doing other activities, patterns of Bloomberg usage allow us to characterize their work habits as measures of effort provision. We document a positive effect of effort on unexpected earnings and cumulative abnormal returns following earnings announcements, and a reduction in credit default swap spreads. This is robust to using exogenous weather patterns as an instrument. Long‐short, calendar‐time effort portfolios earn significant average daily returns. Finally, we revisit important agency issues from the literature.

Frequent, yet uninformed, market timing recommendations by a financial advisory firm generate significant flows for Chilean pension funds. These flows induce substantial changes in the Chilean foreign exchange rate due to the funds’ high allocation to international securities. Local banks provide liquidity to pension funds in the spot market and their hedging transactions propagate the demand fluctuations from the spot to the forward market, resulting in deviations from covered interest rate parity. Using bank balance sheet data, we confirm that banks’ risk bearing constraints create limits to arbitrage.