A firm chooses its debt maturity structure and default timing dynamically, both without commitment. Via the fraction of newly issued short-term bonds, equity holders control the maturity structure, which affects their endogenous default decision. A shortening equilibrium with accelerated default emerges when cash flows deteriorate over time so that debt recovery is higher if default occurs earlier. Self-enforcing shortening and lengthening equilibria may coexist, with the latter possibly Pareto dominating the former. The inability to commit to issuance policies can worsen the Leland problem of the inability to commit to a default policy-a self-fulfilling shortening spiral and adverse default policy may arise.

We propose a dynamic model of investment and trade in a market of a specialized technology subject to two main frictions. First, agents cannot raise outside capital. Second, a random group of agents will have the opportunity to invest in new technology and these opportunities are not contractible. The first friction implies the presence of invesment cycles with abundant invesment and low returns in booms and little invesment and high returns in recessions. Only when the second friction is present invesment cycles are constrained inefficient. Often the inefficiency is two-sided with too much invesment in booms and too little in recessions from a social point of view. Interventions targetting only the underinvesment in recessions might make all agents worse off. Also, the two-sided inefficiency typically implies too volatile prices and too frequent realizations of abnormally low prices compared to fundamentals.

A firm chooses its debt maturity structure and default timing dynamically, both without commitment. Via the fraction of newly issued short-term bonds, equity holders control the maturity structure, which affects their endogenous default decision. A shortening equilibrium with accelerated default emerges when cash flows deteriorate over time so that debt recovery is higher if default occurs earlier. Self-enforcing shortening and lengthening equilibria may coexist, with the latter possibly Pareto dominating the former. The inability to commit to issuance policies can worsen the Leland problem of the inability to commit to a default policy–a self-fulfilling shortening spiral and adverse default policy may arise.

We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent‐but‐illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding‐out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.

US government bonds are considered to be the world's safe store of value, especially during periods of economic turmoil such as the events of 2008. But what makes US government bonds “safe assets”? We highlight coordination among investors, and build a model in which two countries with heterogeneous sizes issue bonds that may be chosen as safe asset. Our model illustrates the benefit of a large absolute debt size as safe asset investors have “nowhere else to go” in equilibrium, and the large country's bonds are chosen as the safe asset. Moreover, the effect becomes stronger in crisis periods.