This paper provides an analysis of the choice of method for raising additional equity capital by listed firms. Examination of expenses reported to the SEC indicates that rights offerings involve significantly lower costs; yet underwriter are employed in over 90 percent of the offerings. The underwriting industry, finance textbooks, and corporate proxy statements offer several justifications for the use of underwriters. However, estimates of the magnitudes of these arguments indicate that they are insufficient to justify the additional costs of the use of underwriters. The use of underwriters thus appears to be inconsistent with rational, wealth-maximizing behavior by the owners of the firm. The paper concludes with an examination of alternate explanations of the observed choice of financing method.

Reviews the book "Managerial Accounting: Concepts for Planning, Control, Decision-Making," by Ray H. Garrison.

A discrete version of the author's incentive-compatible Auction Mechanism for public goods is applied to the problem of social choice (voting) among distinct mutually exclusive alternatives. This Auction Election is a bidding mechanism characterized by (1) unanimity, (2) provision for the voluntary compensation of voters harmed by a winning proposition, and (3) incentives for "reasonable" bidding by excluding members of a collective from maximal increase in benefit if they fail to agree on the proposition with largest surplus. Four of five experiments with six voters, bidding privacy, monetary rewards, and cyclical majority rule structure choose the best of three propositions.

This paper examines how well the basic properties of the traditional 2 × 2 model of a competitive economy, commonly used in much of the pure theory of international trade, generalize when more goods and factors are considered. The notion of factor intensity and the Hekscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson, and Rybczynski theorems are discussed. The role played by the no-joint-production assumption as opposed to small dimensionality in the latter two results is stressed. The mathematical appendix provides a compact and formal statement of the properties discussed in the text.

This paper examines how well the basic properties of the traditional 2 × 2 model of a competitive economy, commonly used in much of the pure theory of international trade, generalize when more goods and factors are considered. The notion of factor intensity and the Hekscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson, and Rybczynski theorems are discussed. The role played by the no-joint-production assumption as opposed to small dimensionality in the latter two results is stressed. The mathematical appendix provides a compact and formal statement of the properties discussed in the text.