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An empirical study of the role of management accounting systems following takeover or merger
Measuring Executive Compensation: Methods and an Application
Executive compensation, Contracting, Stock options
Experimental Economics: Reply
Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor Force
In this paper we investigate the reasons for the growth in the female labor force in America during the twentieth century. In our research, we study the longer-term trends since 1900 and conduct a more intensive examination of developments after the Second World War. On the basis of our work, we conclude that rising real wages accounted for 60% of the total growth in the female labor force. Half of this wage effect in expanding labor supply was the fertility-reducing consequence of a higher female wage.
Some Colonial Evidence on Two Theories of Money: Maryland and the Carolinas
Auditors and deceptive financial statements: Assigning responsibility and blame*
Public accountants (auditors) who do not prepare the financial statements of their clients are not directly responsible for them. However, if the statements are deceptive, then the question of their indirect responsibility arises. The various kinds of defenses that auditors might present for being excused from responsibility, and/or blame, are examined and evaluated. Relevant parts of the codes of ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are compared on this basis. The ICAO Code is a better codification of auditors' obligations regarding deceptive financial statements. One implication of the analysis is that the issue of the independence of auditors is more complex than the codes suggest, and needs further clarification. Résumé. Les experts‐comptables (vérificateurs) ne sont pas directement responsables des états financiers de leurs clients qu'ils ne préparent pas. Cependant, si les états financiers sont trompeurs, alors la question de leur responsabilité indirecte se pose. Les différentes sortes de défenses que les vérificateurs pourraient présenter pour ne pas être tenus responsables et/ou blâmés sont examinées et évaluées. Les parties pertinentes des codes de déontologie de l'Institut des comptables agréés de l'Ontario et de l'American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sont comparées sur cette base. Le code de déontologie de l'Institut des comptables agréés de l'Ontario est une meilleure codification des obligations du vérificateur en ce qui a trait aux états financiers trompeurs. Une implication de l'analyse, est que la notion de l'indépendance des vérificateurs est plus complexe que ne le suggèrent les codes et demande d'être clarifiée.
Government Expenditures, Deficits, and Inflation: On the Impossibility of a Balanced Budget
A model is presented in which governments can select real expenditure levels that are feasible, but are sufficiently high that a balanced budget is impossible. Thus, governments with large expenditures are committed to inflationary finance schemes. This is the case, even though the governments in question have access to lump-sum taxes. In addition, the model can explain why poorer countries tend to make heavier use of the inflation tax than do wealthier countries, and can account for the existence of country-specific fiat monies. The government that does not have access to the printing press can, nonetheless, use emergency taxes or compulsory loans for emergency financing. S.Fischer [1982, p. 297]
The Application of Errors-In-Variables Methodology to Capital Market Research: Evidence on the Small-Firm Effect
James R. Booth, Richard L. Smith, II, The Application of Errors-In-Variables Methodology to Capital Market Research: Evidence on the Small-Firm Effect, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 501-515
The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies
We develop a positive theory of the hedging behavior of value-maximizing corporations. We treat hedging by corporations simply as one part of the firm's financing decisions. We examine (1) taxes, (2) contracting costs, and (3) the impact of hedging policy on the firm's investment decisions as explanations of the observed wide diversity of hedging practices among large, widely-held corporations. Our theory provides answers to the questions: (1) why some firms hedge and others do not; (2) why firms hedge some risks but not others; and (3) why some firms hedge their accounting risk exposure while others hedge their economic value.