Bank regulators tend to disagree with the idea that markets can play a role in bank regulation. The markets for bank securities are viewed by regulators as inefficient and lacking the necessary information to demand sufficient risk premiums on bank obligations to affect bank management decisions. On the other hand, bankers who have an active market for their securities tend to place faith in market assessments to determine the cost of management policies; therefore, they tend to think that the market plays an important role in “regulating” bank management decisions. The regulators are perhaps correct about the markets for small and medium–sized banks, but for those banks which have an active market for their securities, do investors adjust rates of return for the presence of increased potential of bankruptcy? If so, when does the adjustment take place

Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early-warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area

Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early‐warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area

This study compares the dividend policies of independently owned and bank holding company-affiliated commercial banks. The hypothesis tested is that there exists a significant, positive relationship between the amount of cash dividends paid by a bank and its affiliation with a holding company. The issue is an important one because the distribution of earnings as dividends obviously reduces a bank's ability to generate capital internally, and retained earnings have been the chief source of growth in bank equity capital. For some time the bank supervisory authorities have been concerned over the relative decline in importance of capital in the balance sheet of the average bank, such funds permitting banks to absorb unexpected losses and weather periods of financial crises. Capital adequacy is thus a major consideration in the regulators' assessment of bank dividend policy. Prior research has shown that the banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies have maintained lower capital in relation to assets than have other banks despite achieving greater profitability. Since a bank's capital position is usually positively correlated with its earnings, this implies that affiliated banks have been more generous in paying dividends. Indeed, the statistical evidence of this study indicates that the banking subsidiaries of holding companies paid significantly higher dividends than other banks over the four–year period from 1973 through 1976. Whether or not this has resulted in these firms maintaining less than “adequate†capital is a question that goes far beyond the scope of this paper, but which ultimately must be considered

T he remarkable growth of bank holding companies (BHCs) during the last decade has aroused a great deal of interest and controversy among academic economists and bank regulators. One of the important issues discussed has been the impact of holding company affiliation on the operating performance of the acquired banks. Subsequent empirical testing of the question has produced a wide array of results. Nevertheless, a recent survey of the literature by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board [18] concluded that while not entirely unambiguous, the findings are “relatively consistent and conclusive.” Such a sweeping generalization seems premature at best. In a recent issue of this Journal [4], we proposed an empirical model designed to test the interdependency between financial decision‐making and bank performance. The purpose of this note is to examine the implications of that investigation for the BHC performance issue. The impact of affiliation on bank performance has been analyzed in several different ways; however, no study has considered the important theoretical and statistical implications of the simultaneity question

The remarkable growth of bank holding companies (BHCs) during the last decade has aroused a great deal of interest and controversy among academic economists and bank regulators. One of the important issues discussed has been the impact of holding company affiliation on the operating performance of the acquired banks. Subsequent empirical testing of the question has produced a wide array of results. Nevertheless, a recent survey of the literature by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board [18] concluded that while not entirely unambiguous, the findings are “relatively consistent and conclusive.” Such a sweeping generalization seems premature at best. In a recent issue of this Journal [4], we proposed an empirical model designed to test the interdependency between financial decision-making and bank performance. The purpose of this note is to examine the implications of that investigation for the BHC performance issue. The impact of affiliation on bank performance has been analyzed in several different ways; however, no study has considered the important theoretical and statistical implications of the simultaneity question