This study investigates the direct link between regulatory enforcement actions and the shrinkage of bank loans to sectors likely to be bank dependent. We focus on New England because that region has experienced both the widespread application of formal regulatory actions and substantial reductions in new lending by banks. Controlling for weakness in loan demand, previous studies have been able to attribute part of this bank shrinkage to loan supply, with the degree of a bank’s shrinkage related to its capital-to-asset ratio. In this study, we further partition the shrinkage due to loan supply into the component due to explicit regulatory enforcement actions and that due to a voluntary response by bank management to low capital-to-asset ratios. We find that banks with formal actions shrink at a significantly faster rate than those without, even after controlling for differences in capital-to-asset ratios. Furthermore, much of the reduced lending has been in loan categories containing primarily bank-dependent borrowers, indicating that the capital crunch has resulted in a credit crunch

A popular explanation for the explosive growth in banks' off-balance sheet (OBS) activities is the avoidance of capital adequacy requirements. Several studies have examined this and other motivations behind bank OBS activities with mixed results. We shed further light on the issue of OBS growth by modelling OBS products as financial innovations subject to a logistic diffusion adoption pattern. Our data also allows us to investigate the impact of important changes in capital adequacy regulations on OBS diffusion rates. We find that changes in capital requirements have had no consistent impact on the speed of diffusion across OBS activities

This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure.For statecharactered Kansas banks during 19 10-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework.In addition to standard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and measures of technical efficiency to explain bank failure.The results indicate that deposit insurance system membership increased theprobability of failure and banks which were technically inefficient were more likely to fail than technically efficient banks

This paper extends the standard single-period model of deposit insurance to a mutliperiod setting. It incorporates a variety of features describing bank and regulator behavior, such as endogenous capital adjustments and regulatory forbearance. Budgetary costs of deposit insurance are found using contingent claims techniques. We show how the market value of a bank′s net worth, a critical input of the model, can be estimated using accounting cash flow data and information from aggregate bank stock prices. Using Call Report data on U.S. commercial banks, we provide empirical estimates of the aggregate cost of deposit insurance under alternative regulatory policies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G13, G21, G28, H61

In a broad-based democracy, not all contracts will survive. Even some efficient contracts will be banned, if enough people dislike them. Thus if the average voter dislikes powerful private financial institutions, politics will, all else being equal, ban them. Interest groups cancel one another out. One group wants powerful financial institutions and another, such as small-town bankers, does not. The small-town bankers have a leg up in the political infighting, because popular opinion is on their side, leading to a ban on some arrangements that a less regulated economy might produce. Or, to recast the problem in agency cost terms, managers would like to be free from the oversight that powerful financial intermediaries might provide, and in the modern era, politicians might side with managers when the managers’ goals of thwarting takeovers align with a public wary of too many hostile takeovers. The politician can satisfy the managerial interest group and be popular at the same time. Agency costs move into the political arena; some contracts are banned, and whether the substitutes that arise are always perfect ones, without additional costs, is an open question. Law restricted the dominant financial institutions from the end of the nineteenth century onward. American banks were fragmented geographically, lacking the size to take big slices of capital of the large American firms emerging at the end of the nineteenth century. Banks’ products and portfolios have been further restricted: they were barred from the securities business and from owning stock. Their affiliates were also restricted in the stock they could own. Insurers could not buy stock for most of this century. Mutual funds cannot easily devote their portfolios to big blocks and face legal problems if they go into the boardroom. Pensions cannot take very big blocks without legal and structural problems; the big private pensions are under managerial control, not the other way around. These rule were neither random nor economically inevitable. While public interest goals of keeping financial intermediaries prudent and stable explain some of the rules, they do not explain all of them. Two dominant themes lay behind many of the rules: American public opinion, which mistrusted private large accumulations of power, and interest group politics. There were winners in fragmenting financial institutions. These winners had a large voice in Congress, and their goals matched public opinion. For example, small banks wanted to shackle large ones and succeeded in getting and keeping branching limits, banks on banks in the securities business, banks on bank affiliates’ moving outside of banking, and deposit insurance (which, by guaranteeing depositors that they will be paid if the bank fails, helps smaller, weaker banks more than it helps more solid, often bigger banks). These features of the political economy of American finance became foundational for corporate finance and the separation of ownership from control