Supervisory assessments such as stress-tests gauge banks’ riskiness and allow regulators to impose bank-specific capital regulation. This can improve welfare. Yet, regulation based on noisy supervision can decrease welfare by mis-classifying banks, distorting incentives, and crucially, leading to greater risk taking. Regulation should not be bank-specific in such cases. When bank defaults are costlier, supervision should strive for lower probability that riskier banks go undetected, i.e., reduce false-negatives even if this causes more false-positives. When the supervisor can incur a cost to optimally reduce both false-positive and false-negative rates, the regulator should make capital requirements more bank specific

We explore and summarize the evolution in bank capital regulations and bank risk after the global financial crisis. Using a new survey of bank regulation and supervision covering more than 120 economies, we show that regulatory capital increased, but some elements of capital regulations became laxer. Analyzing bank-level data, we also document the importance of defining bank regulatory capital narrowly as the quality of capital matters in reducing bank risk. This is particularly true for banks that have more discretion in the computation of regulatory capital ratios and are subject to weaker market monitoring

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the effects of liquidity regulation on the banking system. We document that the current quantity-based liquidity rule has reduced banks' liquidity risks. However, the mandated liquidity buffer appears to crowd out bank lending and lead to a migration of liquidity risks to banks that are not subject to liquidity regulation. These findings motivate a model of liquidity regulation with endogenous liquidity premiums and heterogeneous banks. The model shows that the current liquidity rule can improve upon the unregulated equilibrium but can also have distortionary effects because of the dual role of the liquidity buffer as an implicit tax and a costly mitigator of liquidity risks. The fixed quantity mandate can interact with the uncertain liquidity demand, amplifying the volatility in the liquidity premium. A central bank committed liquidity facility could improve the current quantity-based regulation by introducing a price-based mechanism

Banks take costly actions (such as capitalization, liquidity holding, and advanced risk management) to avoid financial distress and creditor runs. While directly affecting a bank’s risks, such actions can also signal the bank’s fundamentals. We show that prudential regulations have an informational impact: sufficiently tight regulations can eliminate inefficient separating equilibria in banks’ signaling game, thereby changing the information available to creditors and their incentives to run. When accounting for this informational impact, tightening regulations can improve banks’ payoffs and be considered bank incentive-compatible. We support this novel, information-based rationale for regulations with evidence from the US liquidity requirement

The role of bank regulation and supervision (RS) on financial stability and welfare has been subject to ongoing research, especially since the Great Recession. RS is expected to help eliminate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that are abundant in financial transactions. In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model that is augmented by either a bank regulatory and supervisory agent who chooses the level of RS by maximizing bank profits, or by a macroprudential agent who minimizes non-performing loans (NPL). We compare the long-term outcomes of these scenarios and show that minimizing NPL is feasible for a larger and economically more viable range of parameter values than the alternatives. Moreover, for a comparable set of parameter combinations, the optimal choice of RS that minimizes NPL leads to both higher levels of steady state income and lower interest spreads as compared to RS that maximizes bank profits

This paper analyzes the impact of incentive pay for bank managers on financial stability. The study focuses on two banks owned by risk-neutral principals but operated by risk-averse managers who decide on leverage and the extent of diversification into the other bank's assets, both of which determine the systemic risk. To begin, we establish the optimal incentive pay contract assuming a planner seeks to maximize the total value of the banks. In equilibrium, we find that the contract excessively relies on relative performance evaluation, leading to an inefficiently high degree of diversification, leverage, and systemic risk. This outcome obtains even when the principal represents the interests of all stakeholders in an individual bank. We demonstrate that only regulation specifically targeting relative performance evaluation can restore efficiency, while existing regulations on managerial pay can inadvertently amplify systemic risk

This article studies the effects of higher bank capital requirements. Using new firm-lender matched credit data from South Korea, we document that Basel III coincided with a 25% decline in credit from regulated banks, and an increase of similar magnitude from non-bank (shadow) lenders. We use our data to estimate the effect of capital requirements on bank credit, and the spillover effect of the reform on non-bank lending. We then build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks and firms that replicates these micro estimates. We find that Basel III can account for most of the observed decrease in regulated bank lending and about three quarters of the increase in shadow lending. The latter is driven exclusively by general equilibrium effects of the reform

This empirical study investigates whether a strong bank culture may help strengthen, weaken, or have no effect on the relationship between regulatory capital and liquidity creation. Using a machine learning approach and banks’ 10-K reports, we first measure the corporate culture of selected bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United State (U.S.) over the period between 1995 and 2019. We find that bank culture does affect the link between regulatory capital and liquidity creation. In particular, while we find that regulatory capital has a negative impact on bank liquidity creation, a strong culture in a bank weakens this negative association. We also find that an increase in asset-side liquidity creation is the main channel through which bank culture exerts its moderating role. Finally, our results are largely driven by smaller banks, banks with a more traditional funding structure and more profitable banks. The results of this study suggest that regulators should consider bank culture as being a crucial element in the monitoring approach when designing bank regulation and supervision

We investigate the role of regulatory forbearance in causing a banking crisis. To mitigate the expected spillover effects of the global financial crisis, the Indian banking regulator allowed banks to restructure loans without creating provisions. The forbearance continued beyond the crisis due to political economy-related considerations. Using heterogeneity in the application of the policy, we find that healthy banks that benefited from forbearance became undercapitalized due to the non-recovery of unhealthy borrowers whose accounts were restructured. The undercapitalization led to distortionary lending practices; some distortions took the form of a quid pro quo between the government and the undercapitalized banks

We analyze how capital requirements from environmental risk exposure affect bank lending to the corporate sector, and how these effects transmit to real economic activity and to greenhouse gas emissions. To do so, we exploit the introduction of a policy in Brazil that required banks to incorporate environmental risks in their capital assessments. Using comprehensive credit data, we find that the policy induces large banks to reallocate their lending away from exposed sectors. The credit contraction has no substantial impact on the real activity and greenhouse gas emissions of these sectors, as smaller banks expand their lending afterwards. However, the policy triggers a moderate labor reallocation from small firms (i.e., those with higher costs of switching lenders) and into large firms within environmentally exposed sectors