This paper reviews the extant empirical studies of financial innovation. Adopting broad criteria and spanning a long time horizon, we found surprisingly few studies (39), with most (23) having been conducted since 1998. Especially striking is that only two studies test hypotheses advanced in many descriptive articles as to the economic/environmental conditions that encourage financial innovation. We offer conjectures as to why empirical studies of financial innovation are comparatively rare, including as a culprit the absence of accessible data. We urge financial regulators to undertake more surveys of financial innovation and to make the resulting data available to researchers

This paper reviews the extant empirical studies of financial innovation. Adopting broad criteria, the authors found just two dozen studies, over half of which (fourteen) had been conducted since 2000. Since some financial innovations are examined by more than one study, only fourteen distinct phenomena have been covered. Especially striking is the fact that only two studies are directed at the hypotheses advanced in many broad descriptive articles concerning the environmental conditions (e.g., regulation, taxes, unstable macroeconomic conditions, and ripe technologies) spurring financial innovation. The authors offer some tentative conjectures as to why empirical studies of financial innovation are comparatively rare. Among their suggested culprits is an absence of accessible data. The authors urge financial regulators to undertake more surveys of financial innovation and to make the survey data more available to researchers

This paper investigates the pricing effects of financial innovation in an economy with endogenous participation and heterogeneous income risks. The introduction of non-redundant assets endogenously modifies the participation set, reduces the covariance between dividends and participants' consumption and thus leads to lower risk premia. In multisector economies, financial innovation spreads across markets through the diversified portfolio of new entrants, and has rich effects on the cross-section of expected returns. The price changes can also lead some investors to leave the markets and give rise to non-degenerate forms of participation turnover. The model is consistent with several features of financial markets over the past few decades: substantial innovation, higher participation, significant turnover in investor composition, improved risk management practices, a slight increase in real interest rates, and a reduction in risk premia

This paper investigates the effect of (potential) market size on entry of new drugs and pharmaceutical innovation. Focusing on exogenous changes driven by U. S. demographic trends, we find a large effect of potential market size on the entry of nongeneric drugs and new molecular entities. These effects are generally robust to controlling for a variety of supply-side factors and changes in the technology of pharmaceutical research

We investigate the relative pricing of an innovated security called “instalment receipts” (IRs). IRs are securities that evidence the purchase of some underlying securities on an instalment basis. Theoretically, we show that investors with borrowing restrictions will be willing to pay for the leverage benefit embedded in IRs. We then provide an empirical support for our argument. The observed premium in IR price over the underlying price implies that by using IRs, the issuers benefit from both an increase in demand and a reduction in the price concessions that they have to make to ensure the success of their offerings

This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The structure of Markov perfect equilibria is identified. It is generally not true that competition is fiercest when firms are closest. Rather, firms invest under two distinct circumstances: while sufficiently ahead, to outstrip their rival and secure a durable leadership; while behind, to regain leadership and prevent the situation from worsening to the point where their rival outstrips them

This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The structure of Markov perfect equilibria is identified. It is generally not true that competition is fiercest when firms are closest. Rather, firms invest under two distinct circumstances: while sufficiently ahead, to outstrip their rival and secure a durable leadership; while behind, to regain leadership and prevent the situation from worsening to the point where their rival outstrips them

Public policies designed to increase utilization of existing technologies may also affect incentives to develop new technologies. This paper investigates this phenomenon by examining policies designed to increase usage of preexisting vaccines. I find that these policies were associated with a 2.5-fold increase in clinical trials for new vaccines. For several diseases, the induced innovation is socially wasteful, though small in magnitude. In one case, however, the "dynamic" social welfare benefits from induced innovation exceed the policies' "static" benefits from increasing vaccination with existing technology. These findings underscore the importance of including technological progress in economic analysis of public policy