In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and the timing of the investment. Innovators privately learn the cost of investing. The investor has to compensate the innovators for their reservation wages, but competition makes screening easier and helps to erode innovators’ informational rents. Consequently, competition leads to faster innovation, because the investor has less need to delay expensive investments. With an endogenous number of innovators investment timing becomes first best

Stocks with increases in idiosyncratic risk tend to earn low subsequent returns for a few months. However, high idiosyncratic risk stocks eventually earn persistently high returns. These results are consistent with positively priced idiosyncratic risk and temporary underreaction to idiosyncratic risk innovations. Because risk levels and innovations are correlated, the relation between historical idiosyncratic risk and returns may reflect both risk premiums and underreaction and yield misleading inference regarding the price of risk. The results reconcile previous work offering conflicting evidence on the price of idiosyncratic risk and help to discriminate among explanations for the idiosyncratic risk-return relation

This paper examines the ability of latent firm and manager characteristics to explain variation in innovation productivity. Evidence suggests that latent, but not observable, firm and manager characteristics explain a large portion of the variation in a firm's innovation productivity. Our tests mostly show that latent firm characteristics explain slightly more of the variation relative to latent manager characteristics. For robustness, our analysis shows no significant difference in the average change in innovation productivity and in abnormal returns following two different samples of manager-firm separations: one where managers' expected innovation abilities are high and the other a random sample. Overall, the results suggest that compared to firm characteristics, managers matter moderately less for corporate innovation

We find strong evidence that firms with employee-friendly workplaces achieve greater innovative success, particularly in industries where innovation is more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, employee-friendly firms were also more inclined to sustain R&D investment during the recent crisis. These findings are consistent with the view that an employee-friendly workplace helps to develop tolerance for failure, which encourages engagement in innovation. We find no support for alternative explanations, such as employee-friendly workplaces helping to attract and retain talented employees and reducing career concerns of executives, which could nurture innovation

Internal finance leads to a stalemate in innovation games; each firm wants to free-ride on the others’ costly experimentation. When instead innovation is financed externally (e.g., with venture capital or initial public offerings), there is an endogenous cost to delay. Waiting to make risky irreversible investment conveys pessimistic information. I characterize the relative sizes of waves of leaders and followers in innovation cycles, and the endogenous, intertemporal distribution of quality as each wave builds and crashes. Finally, old waves leave an adverse selection “hangover,” such that too much early innovation can cause the market for future innovation to break down

We demonstrate theoretically and empirically that strategic considerations are important in shaping the cash policies of innovative firms. In our model, firms compete in product markets with uncertain structure using cash as a commitment device to invest in innovation. We show that firms’ equilibrium cash holdings are related to the expected intensity of competition. The sign and magnitude of this relation depends on firms’ financial constraints. Consistent with the strategic motive for hoarding cash, we show that firms’ cash holdings are negatively affected by their rivals’ cash-holding choices, even more so when competition is expected to be intense

Based on data from 32 countries over the period 1996–2010, this paper is the first to assess the relationship between financial innovation, on the one hand, and bank growth and fragility, as well as economic growth, on the other hand. We find that different measures of financial innovation, capturing both a broad concept and specific innovations, are associated with faster bank growth, but also higher bank fragility and worse bank performance during the recent crisis. These effects are stronger in countries with larger securities markets and more restrictive regulatory frameworks. In spite of these seemingly ambiguous findings, our evidence points to a positive net effect of financial innovation on economic growth: financial innovation is associated with higher growth in countries and industries with better growth opportunities

Many barriers to the international movement of capital across national boundaries have been dismantled over the course of the last 20 years. Financial integration was greatly enhanced by the removal of capital controls on the part of the United States, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, and the Netherlands after 1973; the recycling of surpluses to developing countries through the Euromarkets in the 1970's; the removal of capital controls in the United Kingdom and Japan beginning in 1979; financial integration among European Community countries, including France and Italy, in preparation for 1992; recent moves toward financial liberalization in smaller countries in the Pacific; and the steady process of technical and institutional innovation that has proceeded around the world. Some popular tests of international capital mobility, however, appear to show anomalous results. Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka upset conventional wisdom in 1980 when they concluded that changes in countries' rates of national saving had very large effects on their rates of investment and interpreted this finding as evidence of low capital mobility. The argument

We propose a dynamic framework to study the value of medical innovation in the context of infectious disease. We apply our framework to evaluate an HIV treatment breakthrough known as HAART. The model captures how, in lowering both the expected cost and likelihood of HIV infection, HAART reduced the implicit price of risky sex. Forward-looking agents responded by optimally shifting their behaviour. The model also imposes equilibrium constraints, explicitly capturing how optimal shifts in behaviour affect equilibrium choices by changing both infection probabilities and the ease of finding partners willing to engage in risky sex. Using the estimated model, we conduct counterfactual simulations to compute the value of HAART from the perspective of uninfected agents. This includes the option value of the innovation along with value accruing from changes in sex behaviour in response to HAART introduction. We also calculate the added value of a fully functional vaccine from the perspective of both infected and uninfected agents, where infected agents benefit from a vaccine due to resulting shifts in market equilibrium

In 2007, Pink Sheets LLC assigned each Pink Sheets ® company to a disclosure tier and on its website affixed a colorful graphic to its stock symbol signifying the company's public disclosure level. This unique innovation allows us to investigate the impact of increased salience of disclosure practices on liquidity. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find evidence that firms classified into the Current Information category experienced an increase in liquidity while firms classified into the No Information category experienced a decrease in liquidity, both relative to other unclassified over‐the‐counter firms. This suggests that increases in the salience of disclosure practices via assignment to disclosure tiers affect investors’ attention, leading to changes in trading behavior that ultimately translate into liquidity changes. We also provide evidence that some investors anticipated the resulting liquidity changes because stock returns around a key event date leading up to the release of the disclosure tiers are positively associated with subsequent liquidity changes