We study the role of risk preferences and frictions in portfolio choice using variation in 401(k) default options. Patterns of active choice in response to different default funds imply that, absent participation frictions, 94% of investors prefer holding stocks, with an equity share of retirement wealth declining with age—patterns markedly different from observed allocations. We use this quasi‐experiment to estimate a life‐cycle model and find a relative risk aversion of 2.5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of 0.25, and $160 portfolio adjustment cost. The results suggest that low levels of stock market participation in retirement accounts are due to participation frictions rather than nonstandard preferences such as loss aversion.

We use granular data from an investment firm and a credible identification strategy to estimate the effect of financial advisors' incentives on client investments. Exploiting a natural experiment triggered by the 2018 implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), we find that clients' investments respond strongly to changes in advisor incentives. Advisors react through multiple mechanisms: (i) inducing existing clients to bring in new money, (ii) channeling it to high‐incentive funds, and (iii) attracting more new clients. We also find that the MiFID II reform generated more balanced incentives, which translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger portfolio diversification.

This paper documents a new stylized fact: the cross‐sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously in recent years. We offer one explanation for this decline, namely, firms are increasingly benchmarking CEO compensation to industry peers closest in size, thereby creating pay clusters. Our empirical tests provide support for this explanation and suggest that the rise of industry‐size benchmarking is driven by three institutional factors: the mandatory disclosure of compensation peer groups, proxy advisory influence, and say‐on‐pay regulation. Our findings highlight a consequence of adopting a one‐size‐fits‐all standard in the pay‐setting process.

We use large language models to analyze the content of 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and its portfolio firms. The high‐level meetings convey mostly soft information about the firm, and little about industry or market. Fund manager meetings focus on business models and financial metrics, while governance specialist meetings focus on environmental, social, and governance risks; 0.4% of meetings discuss material nonpublic information. Trades by fund managers increase with meetings attended by senior management, rated as unusually good or bad, where the tone is significantly positive or negative, or assessed as creating consensus. Meeting‐informed portfolios can generate significant outperformance.

We propose a measure of the valuation gap between debt and equity—debt‐equity spread (DES)—based on the difference between actual and equity‐implied credit spreads. DES predicts cross‐sectional stock and bond returns in opposite directions. This predictability is unique compared to existing mispricing measures and cannot be explained by exposures to various risk factors. High‐DES firms are more likely to issue equity and retire debt, and have more insider equity selling. These findings are consistent with DES capturing relative mispricing between debt and equity, and provide empirical support for the model of partially segmented markets in Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2018, Review of Financial Studies 31, 3307–3343).

We show that incorporating defined benefit pension funds in an incomplete markets asset pricing model improves its ability to match the historical equity premium and riskless rate and has important risk‐sharing implications. We document the importance of the pension fund's size and asset demands, and a new risk channel arising from fluctuations in the fund's returns. We use our calibrated model to study the implications of a shift to an economy with defined contribution plans. The new steady state is characterized by a higher riskless rate and a lower equity premium. Consumption volatility increases for retirees but decreases for workers.

Comparing mortgage rates that borrowers obtain to rates that lenders could offer for the same loan, we find that many homeowners significantly overpay for their mortgage, with overpayment varying across borrower types and with market interest rates. Survey data reveal that borrowers' mortgage knowledge and shopping behavior strongly correlate with the rates they secure. We also document substantial variation in how expensive and profitable lenders are, without any evidence that expensive loans are associated with a better borrower experience. Despite many lenders operating in the U.S. mortgage market, limited borrower sophistication may provide lenders with market power.

We examine the relative pricing of nominal Treasury bonds and Treasury inflation‐protected securities in the presence of U.S. default risk. Hedged breakeven inflation is significantly positively related to U.S. default risk, driven by correlation between shocks to default risk and both shocks to inflation swap premia and Treasury yields. To understand the mechanisms through which default risk is related to inflation swaps and sovereign yields, we estimate an affine term structure model to capture their joint dynamics. Our estimation implies that the interaction between inflation dynamics and default is the primary source of differential pricing.

Antitrust laws mandate review of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that exceed an asset size threshold based on accounting standards that exclude most intangible capital. We show that this exclusion leads to thousands of intangible‐intensive M&As being nonreportable. Acquirers in nonreportable deals achieve higher equity values and price markups, especially when consolidating product markets. Furthermore, nonreportable pharmaceutical deals are three times more likely to involve overlapping drug projects, which are subsequently 40% more likely to be terminated. Our results suggest that the growth of intangible assets may exacerbate market power through nonreportable consolidation of the sectors most concerning for consumers.