The law of one price (LOP) is tested for narrowly defined commodities traded in futures markets in different countries during the period 1973–80. Although the LOP holds as an average tendency for most of the commodities, there are instances of large riskless arbitrage returns (before transactions costs). Deviations from the LOP tend to be commodity specific rather than due to a common external factor and they tend to be smaller the longer the maturity of the futures contract.

The financial intermediary's choice of operating as a broker with minimal risk exposure or as an asset‐transformer with interest rate risk is modeled as a funds inventory decision made prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding the borrowing or lending interest rates. It is shown that an increase in the interest rate uncertainty leads the intermediary to reduce its exposure, thereby offering decreased asset‐transformation and more brokerage services. However, a stochastic increase in the interest rates leads to greater asset‐transformation and less brokerage services.

This study uses data from the Livingston survey of expectations to examine the Fisher hypothesis as a model relating expected stock returns and expected inflation. We show that the Fisher hypothesis holds much better for ex ante expectations than ex post realizations.

This study examines the relation between common stock returns, trading activity and market value. Our results indicate that although firm size and trading activity are highly correlated, differences in trading activity are not the underlying reason for the firm size anomaly, the finding of systematic differences in risk adjusted returns across stocks of firms of different size.

We present a general procedure for aggregating expert forecasts which exploits regularities in the structure of information within the forecaster population. Specific information structures lead to aggregation methods which adjust for additive bias, differences in individual accuracy, and correlation among forecasts. As an application, we construct composite predictions of the weekly change in the money supply from forecasts made by twenty major securities dealers, for which high positive correlation is found to be a significant characteristic. Due to instability in the information structure, our methods cannot improve on the accuracy of a simple average in this case. However, they do capture information about the correlation among money supply forecasts which is not fully impounded in short‐term interest rates. Forecasts from our models accurately predict the direction of price changes for Treasury bills and Treasury bill futures after a money supply announcement.

This paper investigates the effect of inflation and taxes on the optimal duration of investments. The main conclusion is that inflation does not always increase the duration of investments. For example, in the case of equipment with a short replacement cycle, increased inflation tends to decrease the duration of the cycle. Contrary to the common theoretical analysis, these results imply that inflation may increase some forms of capital investments.

The 1968 amendment to Regulation D of the Federal Reserve Code permits banks to carry forward one sequential reserve excess or deficiency into the next reserve accounting period. This was intended to reduce the weekly pressure on individual banks to adjust their reserve position. We find, instead, that the carry‐forward provision gives individual banks an incentive to alternate weekly between reserve excesses and reserve deficiencies. Thus, the carry‐forward provision tends to induce reserve position adjustments even in the absence of changes in the level of deposits. In addition, the carry‐forward provision reduces the impact of interest‐rate changes on the desired level of excess reserves.

Supply and demand functions for loanable funds are postulated for a no‐inflation economy and equilibrium levels of saving, investment, and the interest rate are specified. Certainty and nondepreciating assets are assumed. An exogenous inflation rate is imposed upon this same economy and new equilibrium values for these same variables are established. The analysis is performed twice. The first time, a Modigliani‐Miller [17] tax structure is assumed while the second analysis assumes a Miller‐Scholes [15] tax structure. In both cases, inflation causes the nominal rate to increase by more than the inflation rate. The analysis is repeated assuming that investments live for one period and are then written off against taxable income at historical cost. In both tax structures, the level of saving and investment is a decreasing function of the inflation rate.

This paper develops incentive schemes which motivate a manager to release private information that he has concerning the probabilities of occurrence of the various output levels of his firm. It is shown that, in the context of a pure‐exchange economy, a complete prohibition on the manager's trading in his firm's stock is sufficient to motivate him to truthfully release his private information. When the setting is extended to that of a production‐exchange economy, the manager must also be allowed to choose the production plan that he most prefers in order for him to be motivated to release his information truthfully. In fact, no incentive scheme in a general production‐exchange economy can be guaranteed to motivate the manager to release his information truthfully if he is not allowed to choose the production plan freely. However, when more structure is placed on the economy, such an incentive scheme can be developed as described in the latter part of this paper.