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On the Robustness of Size and Book-to-Market in Cross-Sectional Regressions.

Journal of Finance 1997 52(4), 1355-82
The authors use a robust regression estimator to analyze the risk premia on size and book-to-market. They find that the risk premium on size that was estimated by Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French (1992) completely disappears when the 1 percent most extreme observations are trimmed each month. The authors also show that the negative average of the monthly size coefficients reported by Fama and French can be entirely explained by the sixteen months with the most extreme coefficients. They argue that further investigation of these results could lead to an understanding of the economic forces underlying the size effect, and may also yield important insights into how firms grow.

Equilibrium Valuation of Foreign Exchange Claims

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 799-826
This article studies the equilibrium valuation of foreign exchange contingent claims. Within a continuous‐time Lucas (1982) two‐country model, exchange rates, interest rates and, in particular, factor risk prices are all endogenously and jointly determined. This guarantees the internal consistency of these price processes with a general equilibrium. In the same model, closed‐form valuation formulas are presented for currency options and currency futures options. Common to these formulas is that stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rates are admitted. Hedge ratios and other comparative statics are also provided analytically. It is shown that most existing currency option models are included as special cases.

When It's Not The Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 683-712
We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk‐neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.