We develop an agency model in which managerial information manipulation creates pooling and entails ex post costs internal and/or external to the firm. We examine the implications of the strategic interactions between shareholders (who set internal governance and managerial incentive compensation), the manager (who exerts effort and reports on its outcome), and an external regulatory authority or RA (who investigates for fraud and levies penalties ex post). When the RA cannot pre-commit to an ex post investigation strategy, a fraudulent equilibrium obtains if the firm's internal governance costs are sufficiently high. Consistent with (so far fairly scant) post-SOX empirical evidence, but the opposite of the implications of signal-jamming models and equilibria with pre-commitment, the model implies an increase in minimum internal governance standards or ex post fraud penalties (as with SOX) results in decreased equilibrium pay-for-performance sensitivity and firm performance.

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank’s private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more

In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms’ performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms. Received December 17, 2018; editorial decision April 3, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul

Environmental regulations may cause firms to reoptimize over pollution inputs. By regulating air emissions in particular counties, the Clean Air Act (CAA) gives firms incentives to substitute toward polluting other media, like waterways, and toward pollution from plants in other counties. I test these hypotheses using the EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). Regulated plants increase their ratio of water-to-air emissions by 177% (102 log points) and their level of water emissions by 105% (72 log points). Regulation of an average plant increases air emissions at unregulated plants within the same firm by 11

Financial regulation is harmonized across countries even though countries vary in their ability to bail-out their banking sector in the event of a crisis. This article addresses the question of whether countries with different fiscal capacity should optimally have different bank regulation, implemented—among other tools—through capital requirements—a question so far ignored by the theoretical banking literature. I show that countries with larger fiscal capacity should have lower ex ante minimum bank capital requirements, in an environment with endogenously incomplete markets and overinvestment due to “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard and pecuniary externalities. I also show that, in addition to a minimum bank capital requirement, regulators in countries with strong “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard should impose a limit on the liabilities pledged by financial institutions in a crisis state. This implies limits on put options/credit default swap contracts. Finally, I argue that the type of regulatory instrument used is crucial as to whether larger fiscal capacity implies more- or less-stringent bank regulation

This paper uses three alternating changes in hedge fund regulation to study whether regulation reduces hedge funds’ misreporting, and, if so, why regulation is effective. Relative to public companies, hedge fund regulation is relatively light. Much of the regime is a “comply‐or‐explain” framework that allows funds to forego compliance with governance rules, providing that they disclose their lack of compliance. The results show that regulation reduces misreporting at hedge funds. Further analysis suggests that the disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal governance, such as hiring or switching the fund's auditor, and that these changes induced funds to report their financial performance more accurately

We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency

I characterize the optimal financial regulation policy in an economy where financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don’t internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficient statistic for the externality and use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries’ equity to measure it

The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “ midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions

Regulators claim to reward firm cooperation in the enforcement process. However, critics question which actions constitute firm cooperation and contend that cooperation leads to “harsh” and “unfair” outcomes. Examining 1,162 enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice, we find that regulator-cited cooperation credit is best explained by remedial actions and self-reported law violations. Cooperation credit is negatively associated with firm monetary penalties assessed by regulators. Our estimates suggest that firms with cooperation credit realize an average penalty reduction of $23.8 million (49 percent). We also estimate that average reputation-related losses are $756 million (70 percent) lower for firms with cooperation credit. We find no association between cooperation credit and related private action outcomes. Our results provide important insight into what constitutes meaningful cooperation with regulators, and suggest that the benefits can be substantial for firms deemed to be cooperative