We propose a more expansive analysis of accounting regulation, highlighting the significance of a regulatory network and the importance of examining the recursive processes involved in the transition from formal law to practice. Our analysis is grounded in the sociology of law and is exemplified by the case of a corporate disclosure regulation for Canada's extractive industry. The paper examines how the regulator, in concert with intermediary actors, works to clarify and influence the practice of law, what we refer to as operationalization. In providing a historically and socially contextualized analysis, the paper treats regulation as a dynamic process that includes multistakeholder working groups, legislative debates, regulatory procedures, and shifting meanings of compliance and enforcement. We examine operationalization as a distinct regulatory dynamic and explore its significance for an expanded understanding of accounting regulation

U sing lenders who become members of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as an exogenous shock, we examine whether and how lenders’ commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures affects borrowers’ environmental performance. We find that borrowers of TCFD-member lenders, relative to control firms, significantly improve their environmental performance after the TCFD launch. Lenders’ disclosure commitments influence borrowers through credit rationing and monitoring. Specifically, polluting borrowers face higher borrowing costs, reduced access to credit, and greater incorporation of environmental action covenants in loan agreements. Additionally, polluting borrowers of TCFD-member lenders experience heightened financial constraints. Finally, borrowers of TCFD-member lenders are more likely to adopt the TCFD framework for climate-related disclosure after the TCFD establishment. Together, these findings illuminate the role of lenders in driving corporate environmental performance improvement through their commitment to transparent climate-related disclosures.

This article studies the disclosure of stress test results by a regulator who is privately informed about bank health when she chooses the stress scenario. I show that the regulator’s choice of the stress scenario depends on how heterogeneous health is across banks. There can be fewer runs than under transparency. However, there are more runs than when the regulator chooses the scenario before becoming informed, highlighting a time-inconsistency problem. Moreover, disclosure can become a source of informational contagion, as changes in the health of one bank affect beliefs about other banks. The model explains the empirical puzzle that a bank’s share price can fall even though it passes the stress test

We study a macroprudential regulation in the emerging market of Chile that raised loan-loss provisions for residential mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios above 80%. The policy reduced high-LTV borrowing and overall leverage but unintentionally affected households likely to borrow above 80% LTV based on preregulation characteristics. These borrowers liquidated term deposits to meet higher down payments, lowering liquidity and raising short-term delinquency, especially near the threshold. The results uncover a regulatory trade-off: systemic risk is curbed, but financially constrained households face short-term vulnerability

We study whether and how the market value of corporate real estate (REMV) shapes acquirer M&A performance. Using hand-collected loan agreements linked to M&A deals, we show that financing secured by real estate embeds tighter acquisition covenants and that, unlike other collateral, real estate collateral is associated with higher announcement returns. Instrumental-variables estimates based on headquarters-state property taxes, crime rates, and local natural-disaster exposure support a causal link from REMV to M&A deal performance. A two-by-two design crossing industry growth opportunities with acquisition covenants shows that both lender screening and financial flexibility mechanisms operate: returns are strongest when growth opportunities are high and covenants are restrictive, remain positive but smaller when only one channel is active, and vanish when both are weak. Consistent with ex-ante screening, acquirers borrowing against real estate are more likely to withdraw deals with negative announcement reactions. Our findings highlight the importance of real estate collateral in shaping corporate investment outcomes and suggest that real estate appreciation enhances firms' capacity to undertake more disciplined and value-creating acquisitions.

We extract information from earnings call transcripts to develop a comprehensive and reliable measure of labor shortage exposure. After validating the measure at the state, industry, and firm levels, we show that firms with labor shortage exposures experience lower earnings call CARs, future stock returns and operating performance. Firms respond to labor shortages by substituting labor with capital and R&D investments, and by producing more production-process patents. Such responses help mitigate the negative effects on future performance. Our measure has broad applicability, and our findings provide new insight into labor-capital substitution in imperfectly competitive labor markets.

We evaluate the efficiency of dynamic linked environmental regulation. Linked regulation allows inspectors who uncover violations at one plant to increase future enforcement at other plants that share a common owner. When compliance costs are correlated, regulators can then target scarce enforcement resources towards bad actors without inspecting everyone. We develop an empirical framework of dynamic moral hazard under linked regulation that allows for large portfolios of plants and for choices to be interdependent within the portfolio of plants and across time. Using the framework we evaluate a linked regulation scheme in Texas and find that linked regulation performs substantially better than both unlinked regulation and untargeted regulation. We test two alternative theoretical mechanisms that underpin the benefit—a “firm-wide moral hazard mechanism” and a “correlated targeting mechanism”—and find that a large share of the value of linked regulation is due to the former

This paper studies the effect of reporting regulation on private firms' bank credit and its economic consequences. I exploit the Spanish institutional setting, which provides a unique combination of confidential loan data and regulatory features that generate quasi‐exogenous variation in reporting regulation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that firms subject to incremental reporting regulation obtain more bank credit primarily through cash flow–based lending, term loans, and long‐term debt, without higher interest rates. These findings are explained by stronger banking competition and greater reliance on financial statement data. However, firms do not expand their net financial position, as bank credit substitutes for other liabilities, and exhibit weaker performance consistent with the costs of reporting regulation. This evidence from a different setting offers new insights into how reporting regulation influences credit contracting for private firms and strengthens the empirical basis for policy‐making

Many regulations aim to promote coordination among creditors in bankruptcy by ex post restricting their ability to exit distressed firms. However, such restrictions may harm creditors’ ex ante incentives to stay invested, thereby worsening coordination outcomes. We build a dynamic coordination model to show how this force shapes creditor runs, bankruptcy filings, and regulation designs. Intriguingly, filing for bankruptcy early, thereby preserving more assets for latecomers, can prolong firm life. Furthermore, regulators’ clawbacks on prebankruptcy repayments can be superior to firms’ commitment to early bankruptcy filing. Our analysis generates implications for automatic stay, avoidable preference, bank failures, and seniority structure