Journal of Finance Vol. 32 No. 2 1977

INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION

Richard Brealey¹; Hayne E. Leland²; David H. Pyle²

¹ London Business School · ² University of California, Berkeley. We have greatly benefited from discussion with Avraham Beja and James Ohlson

Abstract

NUMEROUS MARKETS ARE characterized by informational differences between buyers and sellers. In financial markets, informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced. Borrowers typically know their collateral, industriousness, and moral rectitude better than do lenders; entrepreneurs possess "inside" information about their own projects for which they seek financing.

DOI

10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x

Volume

32

Issue

2

Pages

371-387

Language

en

Sources

openalex crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓