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Journal of Finance Vol. 55 No. 1 2000

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment

Raghuram G. Rajan1; Henri Servaes2; Luigi Zingales2,3,4,1

1 University of Chicago · 2 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill · 3 Cornell University · 4 University of Illinois Chicago

Abstract

We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them.

DOI
10.1111/0022-1082.00200
Volume
55
Issue
1
Pages
35-80
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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