American Economic Review Vol. 110 No. 11 2020

Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Alex Armand¹; Alexander Coutts²; Pedro C. Vicente³; Inês Vilela⁴

¹ Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, NOVAFRICA, and Institute for Fiscal Studies (email: ) · ² Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and NOVAFRICA (email: ) · ³ Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, BREAD, and NOVAFRICA (email: ) · ⁴ Royal Holloway, University of London, and Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and NOVAFRICA (email: )

Abstract

Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20190842

Volume

110

Issue

11

Pages

3431-3453

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Cite

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