American Economic Review Vol. 99 No. 3 2009

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

Fuhito Kojima¹; Parag A. Pathak²

¹ Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06510. · ² Society of Fellows, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, and Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142.

Abstract

A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets.

DOI

10.1257/aer.99.3.608

Volume

99

Issue

3

Pages

608-627

Language

en

Sources

openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓