American Economic Review Vol. 106 No. 8 2016

Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

Gustavo J. Bobonis¹; Luis R. Cámara Fuertes²; Rainer Schwabe³

¹ Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G7, Canada, and BREAD (e-mail: ) · ² Department of Political Science, University of Puerto Rico-Río Piedras, PO Box 23445, San Juan, PR 00931 (e-mail: ) · ³ Cornerstone Research, 599 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022 (e-mail: )

Abstract

Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20130874

Volume

106

Issue

8

Pages

2371-2405

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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