American Economic Review Vol. 103 No. 1 2013
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
Abstract
In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.103.1.80
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 80-106
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref