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American Economic Review Vol. 93 No. 4 2003

Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India

Rohini Pande

Department of Economics, Yale University, P. O. Box 208269, New Haven, CT 06520.

Abstract

A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.

DOI
10.1257/000282803769206232
Volume
93
Issue
4
Pages
1132-1151
Language
en
Sources
crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib

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