American Economic Review Vol. 98 No. 1 2008

The Mystery of Monogamy

Eric D. Gould¹; Omer Moav²; Avi Simhon³

¹ Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel, and Shalem Center, CEPR, and IZA. · ² Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel, and Royal Holloway, University of London, Shalem Center, and CEPR. · ³ Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, Hebrew University, P.O. Box 12, Rehovot 7600, Israel.

Abstract

We examine why developed societies are monogamous while rich men throughout history have typically practiced polygyny. Wealth inequality naturally produces multiple wives for rich men in a standard model of the marriage market. However, we demonstrate that higher female inequality in the marriage market reduces polygyny. Moreover, we show that female inequality increases in the process of development as women are valued more for the quality of their children than for the quantity. Consequently, male inequality generates inequality in the number of wives per man in traditional societies, but manifests itself as inequality in the quality of wives in developed societies.

DOI

10.1257/aer.98.1.333

Volume

98

Issue

1

Pages

333-357

Language

en

Sources

openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓