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American Economic Review Vol. 90 No. 1 2000

The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption

Daron Acemoglu1; Thierry Verdier2

1 Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA. · 2 DELTA-ENS, 48, Boulevard Jourdan, Paris 75405, France, and CERAS.

Abstract

Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder to prevent, there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public-sector wages. Also, the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income.

DOI
10.1257/aer.90.1.194
Volume
90
Issue
1
Pages
194-211
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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