← Search

American Economic Review Vol. 107 No. 11 2017

Discriminatory Information Disclosure

Hao Li1; Xianwen Shi2

1 Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 6000 Iona Drive, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1L4 (email: ) · 2 Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, ON, Canada, M5S 3G7 (email: )

Abstract

A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure—releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types—dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20151743
Volume
107
Issue
11
Pages
3363-3385
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite